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ABSTRACT
Wage inequality has been significantly higher in the United States than in continental European countries
(CEU) since the 1970s. Moreover, this inequality gap has further widened during this period as the
US has experienced a large increase in wage inequality, whereas the CEU has seen only modest changes.
This paper studies the role of labor income tax policies for understanding these facts, focusing on male
workers. We construct a life cycle model in which individuals decide each period whether to go to
school, work, or stay non-employed. Individuals can accumulate skills either in school or while working.
Wage inequality arises from differences across individuals in their ability to learn new skills as well
as from idiosyncratic shocks. Progressive taxation compresses the (after-tax) wage structure, thereby
distorting the incentives to accumulate human capital, in turn reducing the cross-sectional dispersion
of (before-tax) wages. Consistent with the model, we empirically document that countries with more
progressive labor income tax schedules have (i) significantly lower before-tax wage inequality at different
points in time and (ii) experienced a smaller rise in wage inequality since the early 1980s. We then
study the calibrated model and find that these policies can account for half of the difference between
the US and the CEU in overall wage inequality and 84% of the difference in inequality at the upper
end (log 90-50 differential). In a two-country comparison between the US and Germany, the combination
of skill-biased technical change and changing progressivity of tax schedules explains all the difference
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Why is wage inequality signiﬁcantly higher in the United States than in continental Eu-
ropean countries (CEU)? And why has this inequality gap between the US and the CEU
widened substantially since the 1970s (see Table 1)? More broadly, what are the determi-
nants of wage dispersion in modern economies? How do these determinants interact with
technological progress and government policies? The goal of this paper is to shed light on
these questions by studying the impact of labor market (tax) policies on the determination
of wage inequality, focusing on male workers and using cross-country data.
We begin by documenting two new empirical relationships between wage inequality
and tax policy. First, we show that countries with more progressive labor income tax
schedules have signiﬁcantly lower wage inequality at diﬀerent points in time.1 The measure
of wages we use is “gross before-tax wages” and can therefore be thought of as a proxy for the
marginal product of workers.2 From this perspective, progressivity is associated with a more
compressed productivity distribution across workers. Second, we show that countries with
more progressive income taxes have also experienced a smaller rise in wage inequality over
time, and this relationship is especially strong above the median of the wage distribution.
These ﬁndings reveal a close relationship between progressivity and wage inequality, which
motivates the focus of this paper. However, on their own, these correlations fall short
of providing a quantitative assessment of the importance of the tax structure—e.g., what
fraction of cross-country diﬀerences in wage inequality can be attributed to tax policies?
For this purpose, we build a model.
Speciﬁcally, we construct a life cycle model that features some key determinants of
wages—most notably, human capital accumulation and idiosyncratic shocks. Here is an
overview of the framework. Individuals enter the economy with an initial stock of human
capital and are able to accumulate more human capital over the life cycle using a Ben-Porath
(1967) style technology (which essentially combines learning ability, time, and existing hu-
man capital for production). Individuals can choose to either invest in human capital on
the job up to a certain fraction of their time or enroll in school where they can invest full
time. We assume that skills are general and labor markets are competitive. As a result, the
cost of on-the-job investment will be borne by the workers, and ﬁrms will adjust the wage
rate downward by the fraction of time invested on the job. Therefore, the cost of human
1In contemporaneous work, Duncan and Peter (2008) also construct income tax schedules for a broad set
of countries and empirically investigate the relation between progressivity and income inequality. Although
their measure of progressivity and income is diﬀerent from ours along important dimensions, they document
a strong negative relationship between progressivity and income inequality, consistent with our ﬁndings here.
2The precise deﬁnition of gross wages is given in footnote 12.
2Table 1: Log Wage Diﬀerential Between the 90th and 10th Percentiles (Male Workers)
1978-1982 2001-2005 Change
average average
Denmark – 0.97 –
Finland 0.89 0.94 0.05
France 1.22 1.14 -0.08
Germany 0.93 1.06 0.07
Netherlands 0.84 1.05 0.11
Sweden 0.73 0.87 0.14
CEU 0.92 1.01 0.06
UK 0.99 1.28 0.29
US 1.28 1.60 0.32
capital investment is the forgone earnings while individuals are learning new skills.
We introduce two main features into this framework. First, we assume that individuals
diﬀer in their learning ability. As a result, individuals diﬀer systematically in the amount
of investment they undertake and, consequently, in the growth rate of their wages over the
life cycle. Thus, a key source of wage inequality in this model is the systematic fanning out
of the wage proﬁles.3 Second, we allow for endogenous labor supply choice, which ampliﬁes
the eﬀect of progressivity, a point that we return to shortly. Finally, for a comprehensive
quantitative assessment, we also allow idiosyncratic shocks to workers’ labor eﬃciency and
model diﬀerences in consumption taxes and pension systems, which vary greatly across
these countries.
The model described here provides a central role for policies that compress the wage
structure—such as progressive income taxes—because such policies hamper the incentives
for human capital investment. This is because a progressive system reduces after-tax wages
at the higher end of the wage distribution compared with the lower end. As a result, it
reduces the marginal beneﬁt of investment (the higher wages in the future) relative to the
marginal cost (the current forgone earnings), thereby depressing investment. A key obser-
vation is that this distortion varies systematically with the ability level—and, speciﬁcally, it
worsens with higher ability—which then compresses the before-tax wage distribution. These
eﬀects of progressivity are compounded by endogenous labor supply and diﬀerences in aver-
age income tax rates: the higher taxes in the CEU reduce labor supply—and, consequently,
the beneﬁt of human capital investment—further compressing the wage distribution.
The main quantitative exercise we conduct is the following. We consider the eight
3Recent evidence from panel data on individual wages provides support for individual-speciﬁc growth
rates in wage earnings (cf. Baker (1997), Guvenen (2007, 2009), Huggett et al. (forthcoming)).
3countries listed in Table 1, for which we have complete data for all variables of interest.
We assume that all countries have the same innate ability distribution but allow each
country to diﬀer in the observable dimensions of its labor market structure, such as in
labor income (and consumption) tax schedules and retirement pension system. We then
calibrate the model-speciﬁc parameters to the US data and keep these parameters ﬁxed
across countries. The policy diﬀerences we consider explain about half of the observed gap
in the log 90-10 wage diﬀerential between the US and the CEU in the 2000s and 84% of the
wage inequality above the median (log 90-50 diﬀerential). The model explains only about
24% of the diﬀerence in the lower tail inequality between the US and the CEU, which is
consistent with the idea that the human capital mechanism is likely to be more important
for higher ability individuals and, therefore, above the median of the distribution. We also
provide a decomposition that isolates the roles of (i) the progressivity of income taxes, (ii)
average income tax rates, (iii) consumption taxes, and (iv) the pension system. We ﬁnd
that progressivity is by far the most important component, accounting for about 2/3 of the
model’s explanatory power.
The second question we ask is whether the widening of the inequality gap between the
US and the CEU since the late 1970s could also be explained by the same human capital
channels discussed earlier. One challenge we face in trying to answer this question is that
the country-speciﬁc tax schedules that we derive in this paper are only available for the
years after 2001 (because the detailed information from OECD sources for taxes is only
available after that date), whereas the tax structure has changed over time for several of
the countries in our sample. Fortunately, for two countries in our sample—the US and
Germany—we are also able to derive tax schedules for 1983, which reveal signiﬁcantly more
ﬂattening of tax schedules in the US compared with Germany from 1983 to 2003. When
these changes in progressivity and skill-biased technical change (SBTC) are jointly taken
into account, the (recalibrated) model generates a much larger rise in inequality in the US
than in Germany, in fact, slightly overestimating the actual widening of the inequality gap
between these countries.
Finally, in section 6, we test some key implications of our model for lifecycle behavior
using micro data. First, the model predicts that a country with a more progressive tax
system should have a ﬂatter age proﬁle of average wages (by dampening human capital
accumulation) compared with a less progressive one. Similarly, progressivity will imply a
ﬂatter proﬁle of within-cohort wage inequality over the life cycle. We provide a comparison
of the United States (using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, PSID, data) and Ger-
many (using the German Socio-Economic Panel, GSOEP) and ﬁnd strong support for both
predictions.
41.1 Related Literature
The negative relation between inequality and redistribution has also been studied in earlier
papers. Among these, Benabou (2000), Moene and Wallerstein (2001), and Hassler et al.
(2003) use a political economy framework to explain how countries with high inequality and
low redistribution (e.g., the United States) can coexist with countries with low inequality
and high redistribution (e.g. continental Europe). Hassler et al. (2003) emphasize the in-
teraction between political economy and human capital investment: redistribution reduces
human capital investment by the young, in turn reducing wages throughout the life cycle,
and thus implying that a larger share of voters will beneﬁt from redistributive politics. As
ar e s u l t ,t h em o d e lf e a t u r e sm u l t i p l ee q u i l i b r i a .A ni m p o r t a n ti m p l i c a t i o no ft h i se n v i r o n -
ment is that an increase in pre-tax inequality strengthens the incentives for investment and
reduces, ceteris paribus, the fraction of voters supporting redistribution.
Benabou (2000) explores the eﬀects of redistribution in the presence of imperfect credit
markets. When inequality is very low, the beneﬁt of redistribution comes mainly from higher
output (due to the relaxation of credit constraints for some high productivity individuals).
But when inequality is high, the wealthy do not want redistribution. Thus, support for
redistribution decreases initially with higher inequality. Moene and Wallerstein (2001)
consider the redistributive and insurance aspects of welfare beneﬁts. In their framework,
an increased gap between median and mean income increases political support for welfare
beneﬁts if beneﬁts are targeted to the employed as redistribution, but decreases the political
support if the beneﬁts are targeted to the poor as insurance against income loss. When
the targeting of beneﬁts is made endogenous, their model implies that political support for
insurance against income risk still declines as the gap between the median and the mean
increases. The channels explored in these papers are likely to be complementary to ours.
In terms of methodology, this paper is most closely related to the recent macroeconomics
literature that has written fully speciﬁed models to address US-CEU diﬀerences in labor
market outcomes. Prominent examples include Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998), Ljungqvist
and Sargent (2008), and Hornstein et al. (2007), who focus on unemployment rates, and
Prescott (2004), Ohanian et al. (2008), and Rogerson (2008), who study labor hours dif-
ferences. Several of these papers rely on representative agent models and are, therefore,
silent on wage inequality; and those that do allow for individual-level heterogeneity do not
address diﬀerences in wage inequality. In terms of modeling choices, the closest framework
to ours is Kitao et al. (2008), who study a rich life cycle framework with human capital
accumulation and job search and model the beneﬁts system. Their goal is to explain the
diﬀerent unemployment patterns over the life cycle in the US and Europe.
5Finally, a number of recent papers share some common modeling elements with ours
but address diﬀerent questions. Important examples include Altig and Carlstrom (1999),
Krebs (2003), Caucutt et al. (2006), and Huggett et al. (forthcoming). Altig and Carlstrom
(1999) study the quantitative impact of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on income inequality
arising solely from behavioral responses associated with labor supply and saving decisions
and ﬁnd that distortions arising from marginal tax rate changes have sizable eﬀects on
income inequality. Krebs (2003) studies the impact of idiosyncratic shocks on human capital
investment and shows that reducing income risk can increase growth, in contrast to the
standard incomplete markets literature, which typically reaches the opposite conclusion.
Caucutt et al. (2006) develop an endogenous growth model with heterogeneity in income.
They show that a reduction in the progressivity of tax rates can have positive growth
eﬀects even in situations where changes in ﬂat-rate taxes have no eﬀect. Another important
contribution is Huggett et al. (forthcoming), who study the distributional implications of
the Ben-Porath model and estimate the sources of lifetime inequality using US earnings
data. Finally, Erosa and Koreshkova (2007) investigate the eﬀects of replacing the current
U.S. progressive income tax system with a proportional one in a dynastic model. They
ﬁnd a large positive eﬀect on steady state output, which comes at the expense of higher
inequality. Although our paper has many useful points of contact with this body of work,
to our knowledge, our combination of human capital accumulation, ability heterogeneity,
progressive taxation, and endogenous labor supply is new, as is the attempt to explain
cross-country inequality facts in such a framework.
The next section lays out the main model and explains the various channels through
which tax policy aﬀects wage inequality. Section 3 describes how the country-speciﬁc tax
schedules are estimated and uses the estimates to document two new empirical relationships
between taxes and inequality. Sections 4 and 5 discusses the parameterization and the main
quantitative results. Section 6 examines a series of micro implications of the human capital
mechanism proposed in this paper. Section 7 concludes.
2T h e M o d e l
We begin by describing the features of the human capital investment problem. Using
this environment, we discuss the various channels through which tax policy aﬀects wage
inequality. We then enrich this framework by introducing empirically relevant features
(such as idiosyncratic shocks and labor market institutions) that are necessary for a sound
quantitative analysis.
62.1 Human Capital Accumulation
Consider an individual who derives utility from consumption and leisure and has access to
borrowing and saving at a constant interest rate, r.L e t  be the subjective time discount
factor and assume  (1+r)=1 . Each individual has one unit of time in each period, which
he can allocate to three diﬀerent uses: work, leisure, and human capital investment. If
an individual chooses to work, he can allocate a fraction (i)o fh i sw o r k i n gh o u r s( n)t o





where hs denotes the individual’s current human capital stock and Aj is the learning ability
of individual type j.W ea s s u m et h a ts k i l l sa r eg e n e r a la n dl a b o rm a r k e t sa r ec o m p e t i t i v e .
As a result, the cost of human capital investment is completely borne by workers, and
ﬁrms adjust the hourly wage rate, ws, downward by the fraction of time invested on the
job: ws = PHhs(1   is), where PH is the price of human capital; labor income is simply
ys = wsns.F i n a l l y ,l e t¯ ⌧(y) and ⌧(y) denote, respectively, the average and marginal labor







s.t. cs + as+1 =( 1  ¯ ⌧(ys))ys +( 1+r)as
hs+1 = hs + A
j (hsisns)
↵ (2)
ys = PHhs(1   is)ns. (3)
The opportunity “cost of investment” (in human capital units) is equal to hsisns and,
using equation (1), it can be written as Cj(Qj
s)=( Qj
s/Aj)
1/↵, which will play a key role in
the optimality conditions that follow.
Ak e yp a r a m e t e ri nt h eB e n - P o r a t ht e c h n o l o g yi sAj.H e t e r o g e n e i t yi nAj implies that
individuals will diﬀer systematically in the amount of human capital they accumulate and,
consequently, in the growth rate of their wages over the life cycle. This systematic fanning
out of wage proﬁles is the major source of wage inequality in this model.
72.2 Inspecting the Mechanisms
We are now ready to discuss how taxation of human capital can aﬀect wage inequality. To
this end, it is useful to distinguish between two cases.
Inelastic Labor Supply. First, suppose that labor supply is inelastic. Assuming an





s)= { (1   ⌧(ys+1)) +  
2 (1   ⌧(ys+2)) + ... +  
S s (1   ⌧(yS))}, (4)
which equates the after-tax marginal cost of investment on the left hand side to the after-tax
marginal beneﬁt on the right.4 To understand the eﬀect of taxes, ﬁrst consider the case





s)= {  +  
2 + ... +  
S s}.
Thus, ﬂat-rate taxes have no eﬀect on human capital investment. This is a well-
understood insight that goes back to at least Heckman (1976) and Boskin (1977).5















With progressivity, as long as the individual’s earnings grow over the life cycle, the tax
ratios in (5) will be strictly less than one, depressing the marginal beneﬁt of investment,
which in turn dampens human capital accumulation. Thus, these tax ratios capture the
reduction in the value of future wage earnings compared with the forgone wage earnings
today. This observation motivates our ﬁrst measure of progressivity, what we refer to as
the progressivity wedge, deﬁned as:




between any two ages s and s + k.Ap r o g r e s s i v i t yw e d g eo fz e r oc o r r e s p o n d st oﬂ a tt a x e s ,
4Notice that PH (the price of human capital) does not appear in the optimality condition (4) and, thus,
has no eﬀect on human capital decision. For clarity we set PH =1from here on.
5With pecuniary costs of investment, ﬂat taxes can aﬀect human capital investment, as shown by King
and Rebelo (1990) and Rebelo (1991). Similarly, Robert E. Lucas (1990) shows that ﬂat taxes can have a
negative impact on human capital investment when labor supply is elastic.
8and progressivity increases with the size of the wedge. In the next section, we empirically
measure these wedges from the data.
To understand the eﬀect of progressive taxes on wage inequality, note that the distortion
created by progressivity diﬀers systematically across ability levels. At the low end, indi-
viduals with very low ability whose optimal plan involves no human capital investment in
the absence of taxes would experience no wage growth over the life cycle and, therefore, no
distortion from progressive taxation. At the top end, individuals with high ability (whose
optimal plan implies low wage earnings early in life and very high earnings later) face very
large wedges, which depress their investment. Thus, progressivity reduces the cross-sectional
dispersion of human capital and, consequently, wage inequality in an economy, even with
inelastic labor supply.
Endogenous Labor Supply. Second, consider now the the case with elastic labor supply.















where now the marginal beneﬁt accounts for the utilization rate of human capital, which
depends on the labor supply choice. Our second measure of progressivity is precisely moti-











where ni is the hours per person in country i and navg is the average of ni across all countries
in the sample.6
Now, once again, consider the eﬀect of ﬂat-rate taxes. The intra-temporal optimality
condition for labor-leisure choice implies that labor supply depends negatively on the tax
rate and positively on the level of human capital. A higher tax rate depresses labor supply
choice (as long as the income eﬀect is not too large), which then reduces the marginal beneﬁt
of human capital investment, which reduces the optimal level of human capital. But labor
supply in turn depends on the level of human capital, which further depresses labor supply,
the level of human capital, and so on. Therefore, with endogenous labor supply, even a
6Notice that because of the rescaling by navg,i fac o u n t r yh a ss u ﬃ c i e n t l yh i g hl a b o rh o u r sa n dl o w
progressivity, this wedge measure can become negative (e.g., the US). Therefore, this new measure is
deﬁned relative to a given sample of countries, but is still informative about the relative return to human
capital within a group of countries, which is the focus of this paper.
9ﬂat-rate tax has an eﬀect on human capital investment, which can also be large because of
the ampliﬁcation described here.
In summary, the baseline model studied here implies that countries with more progressive
tax systems will have lower wage inequality. As will become clear later, these countries will
also experience a smaller change in wage inequality in response to technological changes
(such as SBTC). In Section 3, we examine these predictions empirically.
2.3 Enriching the Basic Framework
As stated earlier, the main goal of this paper is to provide a quantitative assessment of
the importance of the tax structure—e.g., what fraction of cross-country diﬀerences in
wage inequality can be attributed to tax policies? For this purpose, we introduce several
empirically relevant features that are necessary for a sound quantitative analysis.
Upper Bound on On-the-Job Investment. We impose an upper bound on the
fraction of time that can be devoted to on-the-job investment: i 2 [0, ], where  <1. Such
an upper bound would arise, for example, when ﬁrms incur ﬁxed costs for employing each
worker (administrative burden, cost of oﬃce space, etc.) or as a result of minimum wage
laws. Individuals can invest full-time by attending school (i =1 )a n de n j o yl e i s u r ef o rt h e
rest of the time. Thus, the choice set is i 2 [0, ] [{ 1}, which is non-convex when  <1.
Finally, human capital depreciates every period at rate  <1.
Idiosyncratic Shocks. It is diﬃcult to talk about wage inequality without any sort of
idiosyncratic shock. In a human capital model, these shocks would interact with investment
choice and can greatly aﬀect the quantitative conclusions we draw from the analysis. Thus,
we introduce idiosyncratic shocks. Speciﬁcally, when an individual devotes (1 is)ns hours
producing for his employer, his eﬀective labor supply becomes ✏ns(1   is), where ✏ is an
idiosyncratic Markov shock with a stationary transition matrix ⇧(✏0 | ✏) that is identical
across agents and over the life cycle. Note that these shocks are not to the stock of human
capital (as, for example, in Huggett et al. (forthcoming)). Instead, these can be viewed as
shocks to the rental rate or to the eﬃciency of labor supply.
Market Structure. Af u l ls e to fo n e - p e r i o dA r r o ws e c u r i t i e si sa v a i l a b l ef o rt r a d ea t
every date and state, allowing markets to be dynamically complete. An Arrow security
that promises to deliver one unit of consumption good in state ✏0 tomorrow costs q(✏0|✏) in
state ✏ today. Individuals completely insure themselves against consumption risk by trading
these securities. Hence, all individuals of a given type j will have the same (and constant)
consumption over the life cycle. However, individuals will have diﬀerent realized paths of
investment, human capital, labor supply, and wages.
10Pension Beneﬁts. It is easy to see from the discussion above of equations (5) and (7)
that the existence of a redistributive pension system will have an eﬀect similar to progressive
taxation. In addition, the retirement pension system represents a major use of tax revenues
collected by governments. Therefore, modeling pensions is important for capturing how
funds are returned to households.
During retirement, individuals receive constant pension payments every period. Essen-
tially, the pension of a worker with ability level j depends on two variables: (i) the average
lifetime earnings of workers with the same ability level (denoted by yj), and (ii) the total
number of years the worker had Social Security eligible earnings by the time he retired,
denoted by mS. The pension function is denoted as ⌦(yj,m S).7
The Tax System and the Government Budget. The government imposes a ﬂat-rate
consumption tax, ¯ ⌧c,i na d d i t i o nt ot h e( p o t e n t i a l l y )p r o g r e s s i v el a b o ri n c o m et a x ,¯ ⌧(y).8
The collected revenues are used for two main purposes: (i) to ﬁnance the beneﬁts system,
and (ii) to ﬁnance government expenditure, G,t h a td o e sn o ty i e l da n yd i r e c tu t i l i t yt o
consumers (because of either corruption or waste). The residual budget surplus or deﬁcit,
Tr,is distributed in a lump-sum fashion to all households.
2.4 Individuals’ Dynamic Program
Individuals solve the following problem (ability type j is suppressed for clarity):







0,s+1 ) |✏)] (9)
s.t.





0)=( 1   ¯ ⌧(y))y + a + Tr, (10)
y = ✏h(1   i)n, (11)
h
0 =( 1    )h + A(hin)
↵, (12)
m
0 = m +1 {i<1&n   nmin}, (13)
i 2 [0, ] [{ 1},
7In reality, pension payments depend on the workers’ own earnings history, but modeling this explicitly
also adds an extra state variable, which this structure avoids.
8Notice that this baseline model does not have a capital income tax, which is challenging to introduce
for at least two reasons. First, because capital is mobile across international borders (much more so than
labor and consumption), it is not exactly clear how we should think about its taxation. Second, and more
importantly, capital income taxation introduces signiﬁcant complications into the numerical solution of the
problem. For these two reasons, we abstract from it in the baseline model here. In Appendix D, we study
a particular way of taxing capital income and ﬁnd that, while it matters quantitatively, it does not alter
the main conclusions of the paper.
11for s =1 ,2,...,S. Equation (13) shows how individuals accumulate years of service, m.
Speciﬁcally, individuals get one more year of service credit if they are not in school (i<1)
and are employed more than a certain threshold number of hours: n>n min.
After retirement, individuals receive a pension and there is no human capital investment.
Since there is no uncertainty during retirement, a riskless bond is suﬃcient for smoothing














s.t (1 + ¯ ⌧c)c + qa




The deﬁnition of a stationary recursive competitive equilibrium in this environment is
standard, so the formal statement is relegated to Appendix A.
3P r o g r e s s i v i t y a n d I n e q u a l i t y : T w o E m p i r i c a l F a c t s
This section has two purposes. First, we discuss the derivation of country-speciﬁc tax
schedules that are used in the rest of the paper. Using these tax schedules, we construct
empirical measures of the two progressivity wedges deﬁned in (6) and (8) above. Second,
with these wedges on hand, we go on to document two new empirical relationships between
wage inequality and the progressivity of (labor income) tax policy that are consistent with
the presented model and further motivate the quantitative analysis that follows.9
3.1 Deriving Country-Speciﬁc Tax Schedules
For each country, we follow the procedure described here. First, the OECD tax database
provides estimates of the total labor income tax for all income levels between half of average
wage earnings (hereafter, AW )t ot w ot i m e sAW. The calculation takes into account several
types of taxes (central government, local and state, social security contributions made by
9In a diﬀerent context, earlier papers by Rodriguez (1998) and Moene and Wallerstein (2001) empiri-
cally documented a negative relation between inequality and redistributive policies other than taxes. In a
regression analysis of eighteen advanced industrialized countries, Moene and Wallerstein (2001) ﬁnd that
greater inequality is associated with lower spending on programs to insure against income loss as a share of
both GDP and total government spending. Rodriguez (1998) reaches a similar conclusion: using data from
20 OECD countries and controlling for national income, population, and the age distribution, he ﬁnds that
pretax inequality has a signiﬁcantly negative eﬀect on every major category of social transfers as a fraction
of GDP.
12Figure 1: Average Tax Rate Functions, Selected OECD Countries, 2003
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the employee, and so on), as well as many types of deductions and cash beneﬁts (dependent
exemptions, deductions for taxes paid, social assistance, housing assistance, in-work bene-
ﬁts, etc.).10 Using these estimates, we calculate the average labor income tax rate, ¯ ⌧(y),f o r
50%, 75%, 100%, 125%, 150%, 175%, and 200% of AW.H o w e v e r ,t a xr a t e sb e y o n d2 0 0 %o f
AW are also relevant when individuals solve their dynamic program. Fortunately, another
piece of information is available from the OECD: the top marginal tax rate and the top
bracket corresponding to it for each country. As described in more detail in Appendix B.1,
we use this information to generate average tax rates at income levels beyond two times
AW. Then, we ﬁt the following smooth function to the available data points:11
¯ ⌧(y/AW)=a0 + a1(y/AW)+a2(y/AW)
 . (15)
The parameters of the estimated ¯ ⌧(y) functions for all countries are reported in Appendix
B.1, along with the R2 values. Although the assumed functional form allows for various
possibilities, all ﬁtted tax schedules turn out to be increasing and concave. The lowest R2 is
0.984 and the mean is 0.991, indicating a very good ﬁt. In Figure 1, we plot the estimated
functions for three countries: one of the two least progressive (United States), the most
progressive (Finland), and one with intermediate progressivity (Germany).
10Non-wage income taxes (e.g., dividend income, property income, capital gains, interest earnings) and
non-cash beneﬁts (free school meals or free health care) are not included in this calculation.
11We have also experimented with several other functional forms, including a popular speciﬁcation pro-
posed by Guoveia and Strauss (1994), commonly used in the quantitative public ﬁnance literature (cf.
Castañeda et al. (2003), Conesa and Krueger (2006), and the references therein). However, we found that
the functional form used here provides the best ﬁt across the board for this relatively diverse set of countries,
as seen from the high R2 values in Table A.1.
13Figure 2: Progressivity Wedges At Diﬀerent Income Levels: 1  
1 ⌧(k⇥0.5)
1 ⌧(0.5) for k =2 ,3,..,6.


















Figure 2 plots the progressivity wedges computed from the estimated tax schedules for
all countries in our sample. Speciﬁcally, each line plots PW(0.5,0.5k) and k =1 ,2,...,6,
which are essentially the wedges faced by an individual who starts life at half the average
earnings in that country and looks toward an eventual wage level that is up to six times
his initial wage. As seen in the ﬁgure, countries are ranked in terms of their progressivity.
Consistent with what one could conjecture, the US and the UK have the least progressive
tax system, whereas Scandinavian countries have the most progressive ones, and larger
continental European countries are scattered between these two extremes. The diﬀerences
also appear quantitatively large (although a more precise evaluation needs to await the
quantitative analysis in the next section): for example, the marginal beneﬁt of investment
for a young worker in the US who invests today when his wage is 0.5 ⇥ AW and expects
to earn 2 ⇥ AW in the future is 13% lower than in a ﬂat-tax system. The comparable loss
is 27% in Denmark and Finland. These diﬀerences grow with the ambition level of the
individual, dampening human capital investment, especially at the top of the distribution.
3.2 Taxes and Inequality: Cross-Country Empirical Facts
The wage inequality data come from the OECD’s Labour Force Survey database and are
derived from the gross (before-tax) wages of full-time, full-year (or equivalent) workers.12
This is the appropriate measure for the purposes of this paper, as it more closely corresponds
to the marginal product of each worker (and, hence, his wage) in the model. The fact that
12More precisely, wages are measured before taxes and employees’ social security contributions and also
include bonuses and overtime pay when applicable. Therefore, they represent a fairly good measure of the
total monetary compensation of a worker.
14Figure 3: Progressivity Wedge (P(0.5, 2.5)) and the L90-10 in 2003.

















































the inequality data pertain to before-tax wages is important to keep in mind; if the data
were for after-tax wages, the correlation between progressivity and inequality would be
mechanical and, thus, not surprising at all. Furthermore, we focus on male workers to
avoid potential selection issues that may arise due to wide diﬀerences in female labor force
participation rates across countries.
We normalize AW in each country to 1 and focus on PW(0.5,2.5) as the measure of
progressivity. Similarly, when we calculate PW⇤ for a given country, we use the average
hours per person in that country between 2001 and 2005 for ni in equation (8), and the
average of the same variable across all countries for navg.13 Finally, for brevity, in the rest of
the paper we will refer to the “log 90-10 wage diﬀerential” simply as “L90-10,” and similarly
for the other wage diﬀerentials.
Figure 3 plots the relationship between L90-10 and the progressivity wedge in the 2000s.
Countries with a smaller wedge—meaning a less progressive tax system and, therefore, a
smaller distortion in human capital investment—have higher wage inequality. The rela-
tionship is also quite strong with a correlation of –0.82.14 (Repeating the same calculation
using PW⇤ yields the same correlation.) Both relationships are consistent with the human
capital model with progressive taxes presented above.
We next turn to the change in inequality over time. Figure 4 plots PW⇤ versus the
13The data on average hours per person for each country have been kindly provided to us by Richard
Rogerson and are the same as those used in Ohanian et al. (2008).
14This strong relationship is robust to using wedges calculated from diﬀerent parts of the income distri-
bution: for example, the correlations between L90-10 and PW(k,k+m) as k and m are varied between 0.5
to 2.5 range from –0.74 to –0.87.
15Figure 4: Progressivity Wedge* (PW*(0.5, 2.5)) and Change in L90-50 (Left) and L50-10
(Right):1 9 8 0t o2 0 0 3




































































































































change in L90-50 (left panel) and L50-10 (right panel). Countries with a more progressive
tax system in the 2000s have experienced a smaller rise in wage inequality since the 1980s.
The relationship is especially strong at the top of the wage distribution and weaker at
the bottom: the correlation between progressivity and the change in L90-50 is very strong
( 0.91), whereas the correlation with L50-10 is much weaker (only  0.27); see Figure 4.
This result is consistent with the idea that the distortion created by progressivity is likely
to be eﬀective especially strongly at the upper end, where human capital accumulation is
an important source of wage inequality, but less so at the lower end, where other factors,
such as unionization, minimum wage laws, and so on, could be more important.
Finally, Table 2 gives a more complete picture of the diﬀerences between the two deﬁni-
tions of wedges. The top panel reports the correlation of each wedge measure with log wage
diﬀerentials, which reveals that the adjustment for utilization rates through labor hours
makes little diﬀerence in the correlations in 2003. Turning to the change in inequality over
time (bottom panel), the simple wedge measure has a somewhat lower correlation with log
wage diﬀerentials. However, adjusting for average hours per person increases these corre-
lations signiﬁcantly to  0.66 for the L90-10, and to  0.91 for L90-50 (plotted in the left
panel of Figure 4). We conclude that progressivity is strongly correlated with inequality
both in the cross-section and over time, especially above the median of the distribution.
Overall, these ﬁndings reveal a close relationship between progressivity and wage in-
equality, which motivates the focus of this paper. However, on their own, these correlations
fall short of providing a quantitative assessment of the importance of the tax structure. For
this purpose, we now take the model to the data.
16Table 2: Correlation Between Progressivity Measures and Wage Dispersion
Measure of Wedge:
PW(0.5,2.5) PW⇤(0.5,2.5)








4P a r a m e t e r C h o i c e s
We now discuss the parameter choices for the model. We focus on male workers so as to avoid
potential selection issues across countries related to diﬀerent labor market participation
rates for female workers. Our basic calibration strategy is to take the United States as
a benchmark and pin down a number of parameter values by matching certain targets in
the US data.15 We then assume that other countries share the same parameter values
with the US along unobservable dimensions (such as the distribution of learning ability),
but diﬀer in the dimensions of their labor market policies that are feasible to model and
calibrate (speciﬁcally, consumption and labor income tax schedules and the retirement
pension system). We then examine the diﬀerences in economic outcomes—speciﬁcally in
wage dispersion and labor supply—that are generated by these policy diﬀerences alone.
Am o d e lp e r i o dc o r r e s p o n d st oo n ey e a ro fc a l e n d a rt i m e .I n d i v i d u a l se n t e rt h ee c o n o m y
at age 20 and retire at 65 (S =4 5 ). Retirement lasts for 20 years and everybody dies at
age 85. The net interest rate, r,i ss e te q u a lt o2 % ,a n dt h es u b j e c t i v et i m ed i s c o u n tr a t ei s
set to   =1 /(1 + r). The curvature of the human capital accumulation function, ↵, is set
equal to 0.80, broadly consistent with the existing empirical evidence (see Browning et al.
(1999, Table 2.3)). In Appendix D, we conduct sensitivity analyses with respect to ↵ and
consider cross-country variation in retirement age S.
15Taking the US as the benchmark is motivated by the fact that its economy is subject to much less of the
labor market rigidities present in the CEU—such as unionization and other distorting institutions. Because
these institutions are not modeled in this paper, the US provides a better laboratory for determining the
unobservable parameters than other countries where these distortions could be more important for wage
determination.
17Utility Function. Preferences over consumption, c, and leisure time, 1 n, are given by
this common separable form:




This speciﬁcation yields two parameters to calibrate: the curvature of leisure, ', and the
utility weight attached to leisure,  . These parameters are jointly chosen to pin down the
average hours worked in the economy, as well as the average Frisch labor supply elasticity.
In 2003, the average annual hours worked by American males was 1,890 hours, or approxi-
mately 5.2 hours per day (Heathcote et al. (2010, ﬁgure 2)). Taking the discretionary time
endowment of an individual to be 13 hours per day, we get n =5 .2/13 = 0.4.16
With power utility, the theoretical Frisch elasticity of labor supply is given by (1  
n)/(n'). Because in this model, labor supply, n,v a r i e sa c r o s si n d i v i d u a l s ,t h e r ei sad i s t r i -
bution of Frisch elasticities. We simply target the Frisch elasticity implied by the average
labor hours, n. The empirical target we choose is 0.3, which is consistent with the estimates
for male workers surveyed by Browning et al. (1999), which range from zero to 0.5.17 As
will become clear later, a higher Frisch elasticity improves the performance of our model,
so in our baseline case we choose the relatively conservative value of 0.3.
Distributions: Learning Ability, Initial Human Capital, and Shocks. Agents have
two individual-speciﬁc attributes at the time they enter the economy: learning ability and
initial human capital endowment. We assume that these two variables are jointly uniformly
distributed in the population and are perfectly correlated with each other.18 Although the
assumption of perfect correlation is made partly for simplicity, a strong positive correlation
is plausible and can be motivated as follows. The present model is interpreted as applying
to human capital accumulation after age 20 and, by that age, high-ability individuals will
have invested more than those with low ability, leading to heterogeneity in human capital
stocks at that age, which would then be very highly correlated with learning ability. Indeed,
16Most countries require a minimum days of work (or income earned) to qualify for pension beneﬁts,
which is captured with nmin in (13). We set nmin =0 .10, which does not bind for any country.
17Although it is common to use higher elasticity values in representative agent macro studies (e.g.,
Prescott (2004) among many others), values of 0.5 or lower are more common in quantitative models with
heterogeneous agents (cf. Heathcote et al. (2008), and Erosa et al. (2009)).
18We prefer the uniform distribution over a Gaussian distribution because it has a bounded support,
so initial human capital and ability can be easily ensured to be non-negative. Another choice would be
al o gn o r m a ld i s t r i b u t i o n ,b u tm o s te m p i r i c a lm e a s u r e so fa b i l i t yﬁ n di tm o r ec l o s e l ya p p r o x i m a t e db y
a symmetric distribution, unlike a log normal one. It will turn out, however, that the wage distribution
generated by the model will be closer to log normal with a longer right tail (more consistent with the data),
as a result of the convexity arising from the human capital production function.
18Table 3: Baseline Parametrization
Parameter Description Value
' Curvature of utility of leisure 5.0 (Frisch = 0.3 )
  Weight on utility of leisure 0.20
↵ Curvature of human capital function 0.80
S Years spent in the labor market 45
T   S Retirement duration (years) 20
r Interest rate 0.02
  Time discount factor 1/(1 + r)







Average initial human capital (scaling) 4.95
Parameters calibrated to match data targets













Coeﬀ. of variation of initial human capital 0.076
  [Aj]/E [Aj] Coeﬀ. of variation of ability 0.396
  Dispersion of Markov shock 0.23
p Transition probability for Markov shock 0.90
  Maximum investment time on the job 0.50
Huggett et al. (forthcoming) estimate the parameters of the standard Ben-Porath model
from individual-level wage data and ﬁnd learning ability and human capital at age 20 to
be strongly positively correlated (corr: 0.792). Making the slightly stronger assumption of
perfect correlation allows us to collapse the two-dimensional heterogeneity in Aj and h
j
0 into
one, speeding up computation signiﬁcantly.
Therefore, this jointly uniform distribution of (Aj,h
j







is a scaling parameter and is simply set to a computationally convenient







, (ii) the mean learning ability, E [Aj],a n d( i i i )t h ed i s p e r s i o no fa b i l i t y ,
  (Aj). The idiosyncratic shock process, ✏, is assumed to follow a ﬁrst-order Markov process,
with two possible values, {1    ,1+ }, and a symmetric transition matrix with Pr(✏0 =
x|✏ = x)=p. This structure yields two more parameters,   and p,t ob ec a l i b r a t e d — f o ra
total of ﬁve parameters. The sixth and last parameter is   (maximum investment allowed
on the job). Finally, because there is measurement error in individual-level wage data, we
add a zero mean i.i.d. disturbance to the wages generated by the model (which has no
eﬀect on individuals’ optimal choices).
Data Targets. Our calibration strategy is to require that the wages generated by
the model be consistent with micro-econometric evidence on the dynamics of wages found
19in panel data on US households. Speciﬁcally, these empirical studies begin by writing a


























s is the “wage residual” obtained by regressing raw wages on a polynomial in age;
the terms in brackets, [aj + bjs],c a p t u r et h eindividual-speciﬁc systematic (or life cycle)
component of wages that result from diﬀerential human capital investments undertaken
by individuals with diﬀerent ability levels, and zj
s is an AR(1) process with innovation ⌘j
s.
Finally, "j
s is an iid shock that could capture classical measurement error that is pervasive in
micro data and/or purely transitory movements in wages. For concreteness, in the discussion
that follows, we refer to the ﬁrst two terms in brackets as the “systematic component” of
wages and to the latter two terms as the “stochastic component.”
We begin with "s and assume that it corresponds to the measurement error in the wage
data. This is consistent with the ﬁnding in Guvenen and Smith (2009) that the majority
of transitory variation in wages is due to measurement error. Based on the results of the
validation studies from the US wage data,19 we take the variance of the measurement error to
be 10% of the true cross-sectional variance of wages in each country, which yields  2
" =0 .034
for the United States. We then choose the following six moments from the US data to pin
down the six parameters identiﬁed earlier:
1. the mean log wage growth over the life cycle (informative about E(Aj)),
2. the ratio of minimum to mean wage (informative about  ),
3. the cross-sectional dispersion of wage growth rates,  (bj) (informative about  (Aj)),
4. the cross-sectional variance of the stochastic component (informative about  ),
5. the average of the ﬁrst three autocorrelation coeﬃcients of the stochastic component
of wages (informative about p), and




The target value for the mean log wage growth over the life cycle (i.e., the cumulative
growth between ages 20 and 55) is 45%. This number is roughly the middle point of the
19For an excellent survey of the available validation studies and other evidence on measurement error in
wage and earnings data, see Bound et al. (2001).
20ﬁgures found in studies that estimate lifecycle wage and income proﬁles from panel data
sets, such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID); see, for example, Gourinchas and
Parker (2002) and Guvenen (2007). The second data moment is the legal minimum wage
in the economy relative to the average wage of full-time workers, which, according to the
OECD,20 was 0.29 for the US in the early 2000s. The third moment is the cross-sectional
standard deviation of wage growth rates,  (bj). The estimates of this parameter are quite
consistent across diﬀerent papers, regardless of whether one uses wages or earnings. We
take our empirical target to be 2%, which represents an average of these available estimates
(Baker (1997), Haider (2001), and Guvenen (2009)).
The next two moments capture key statistical properties of the stochastic component
of wages in the data. These moments are (i) the unconditional variance of the stochastic
component, (zs+"s),a sw e l la s( i i )t h ea v e r a g eo fi t sﬁ r s tt h r e ea u t o c o r r e l a t i o nc o e ﬃ c i e n t s .
The empirical counterparts for these moments are taken from Haider (2001)Plain Lays the
only study that estimates a process for hourly wages and allows for heterogeneous proﬁles.
The ﬁgure for the unconditional variance can be calculated to be 0.109 and the average of
autocorrelations is calculated to be 0.33, using the estimates in Table 1 of Haider’s paper.
Further details and justiﬁcations for these parameter choices are in Appendix C.21
Our sixth, and ﬁnal, moment is L90-10 in 2003. Adding this moment ensures that the
calibrated model is consistent with the overall wage inequality in the US in that year, which
is the benchmark against which we measure all other countries. The empirical target value
is 1.60 (from the OECD’s Labour Force Survey). Table 4 displays the empirical values of
the six moments, as well as their counterparts generated by the calibrated model. As can
be seen here, all moments are matched fairly well.
One point to note is that even though the average of the ﬁrst three autocorrelation
coeﬃcients is pretty low (0.33), the stochastic component includes measurement error as
well, which is iid. The Markov shocks themselves have a ﬁrst order annual autocorrelation
of 0.80 (implied by p =0 .90, shown in Table 3).
Beneﬁts System and the Government Budget. Ag r e a td e a lo fv a r i a t i o nc a nb e
found across countries in the parameters that control the generosity, the duration, and the
20http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=RHMW
21Our calibration produces wage dynamics that are also consistent with what some authors have called a
RIP process. Basically, if we ﬁt an AR(1) process plus an i.i.d shock to the wage process generated by the
model, we ﬁnd a persistence parameter of 0.937, an innovation standard deviation of 19%, and an i.i.d shock
standard deviation of 18%. These are in line with recent estimates in the literature (see, e.g., Storesletten
et al. (2004a)).
21Table 4: Empirical Moments Used for Calibrating Model Parameters
Moment Data Model
Mean log wage growth from age 20 to 55 0.45 0.44
Ratio of minimum to mean wage rate 0.29 0.30
Cross-sectional standard deviation of wage growth rates 2.00% 2.03%
Cross-sectional variance of stochastic component 0.109 0.106
Average of ﬁrst three autocorrelation coeﬀ. of stochastic component 0.33 0.34
L90-10 in 2003 1.60 1.60
insurance component of the beneﬁts system.22 We provide the exact formulas for each
country in Appendix B.4. Turning to the government budget, the calibration of G (the
surplus wasted by the government) is challenging because of the diﬃculty of obtaining
reliable estimates of its magnitude. In the baseline case, we assume G =0 .S o , t h e
government returns all the surplus to households in a lump-sum fashion (Tr). Relaxing this
assumption and allowing for G>0 has very little eﬀect on the results (Appendix D).23
Consumption Taxes. The average tax rate on consumption is taken from McDaniel
(2007), who provides estimates for 15 OECD countries for the period 1950 to 2003 by
calculating the total tax revenue raised from diﬀerent types of consumption expenditures
and dividing this number by the total amount of corresponding expenditure. McDaniel
(2007) does not provide an estimate for Denmark, so we set this country’s consumption tax
equal to that of Finland, which has a comparable value-added tax (VAT) rate.
5Q u a n t i t a t i v e R e s u l t s
In this section, we begin by presenting the implications of the calibrated model for wage
inequality diﬀerences across countries at a point in time. We then provide decompositions
that quantify the separate eﬀects of progressivity, average income tax rates, consumption
taxes, and the pension system on these results. We next turn to the change in inequality
over time and provide a comparison between the United States and Germany from 1983 to
22For example, retirees in Denmark and the Netherlands receive the largest pension payments, with the
present value of average retirement wealth exceeding half a million US dollars (as of 2007). The US and
the UK, however, have the lowest pension entitlements—less than six times the average annual earnings in
each respective country (and less than half the wealth in Denmark and the Netherlands).
23In the working paper version (Guvenen et al. (2009)), we also modeled an unemployment insurance
system that mimics each country’s actual system in place. It turned out that this additional feature made
little diﬀerence (which can be seen by comparing the results in that draft to those reported below), but it
came at signiﬁcant cost to the exposition of the model. Thus, we decided to omit it in this version.
22Figure 5: Wage Dispersion: Model versus Data





















































































2003. The model statistics below are computed from 10,000 simulated lifecycle paths for
individuals drawn from the joint probability distribution of (Aj,h
j
0).
5.1 Cross-Sectional Results: the 2000s
Figure 5 plots L90-10 for each country in the data against the value predicted by the cal-
ibrated model. The correlation between the simulated and actual data is 0.91 (and the
countries line up nicely along the regression line), suggesting that the model is able to cap-
ture the relative ranking of these eight countries in terms of overall wage inequality observed
in the data. To explore how the model fares at diﬀerent parts of the wage distribution, the
middle panel of Figure 5 repeats the same exercise for L90-50 and the bottom panel does
the same for L50-10. In both cases, the model-data correlations are high: 0.85.
In Table 5, we quantify the importance of taxes for cross-country diﬀerences in inequality.
The ﬁrst two columns report L90-10 in the data for all countries, ﬁrst in levels (second
column) and then expressed as a deviation from the US, which is our benchmark country
(third column). For example, in Denmark L90-10 is 0.97, which is 0.63 (i.e., 63 log points)
lower than that in the US. The third and fourth columns display the corresponding statistics
implied by the calibrated model. Again, for Denmark, the model generates an L90-10 that is
0.38 below what is implied by the model for the US. Therefore, the model accounts for 60%
(=3 8 /63) of the diﬀerence in L90-10 between the US and Denmark, reported in column
(e). Similar comparisons show that the model does quite well in explaining the level of
wage inequality in Germany but poorly in explaining the UK. The fraction explained by
the model ranges from 35% for France to 56% for Germany. Overall, the model accounts
for 48% of the actual gap in inequality between the US and the CEU in 2003.
To see which part of the wage distribution is better captured by the model, the next
23Table 5: Measures of Wage Inequality: Benchmark Model versus Data
L90-10 L90-50 L50-10
Data Model % explained %e x p l a i n . %e x p l a i n .
Level   from US Level   from US (d)/(b)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
Denmark 0.97 0.63 1.22 0.38 0.60 0.97 0.31
Finland 0.94 0.66 1.27 0.33 0.49 0.78 0.25
France 1.14 0.46 1.44 0.16 0.35 1.23 0.12
Germany 1.06 0.54 1.29 0.30 0.56 0.90 0.28
Netherlands 1.05 0.55 1.36 0.24 0.43 0.65 0.23
Sweden 0.87 0.73 1.28 0.31 0.43 0.75 0.26
CEU 1.00 0.59 1.31 0.29 48% 84% 24%
UK 1.28 0., 1.56 0.03 10 6 13
US 1.60 0.00 1.60 0.00
two columns display the same calculation performed in column (e), but now separately for
L90-50 (f) and L50-10 (g). For all countries in the CEU, the model explains the upper
tail inequality much better than the lower tail inequality. For example, for Denmark, the
model explains 97% of L90-50 versus only 31% of L50-10. In fact, the model accounts for
at least 65% of L90-50 for all countries in the CEU, averaging 84% across all countries,
whereas it accounts for on average only 24% of L50-10.24 That our model does a better
job at explaining inequality at the upper end (above the median) will be a recurring theme
of this paper. This ﬁnding is consistent with the idea that progressive taxation aﬀects the
human capital investment of high-ability individuals more than others and, therefore, the
mechanism is more eﬀective above the median of the wage distribution. Finally, a notable
exception to these generally strong ﬁndings is the UK, which is an important outlier: the
model explains very little of the diﬀerence between the UK and US at the upper tail (6%
to be exact) and only slightly more (13%) at the lower end.
Decomposing the Eﬀects of Diﬀerent Policies. The baseline model incorporates
several diﬀerences between the labor market policies of the US and those of the CEU
countries. Here, we quantify the separate roles played by each of these components for
the results presented in the previous section. We conduct three decompositions. First, we
assume that countries in the CEU have the same retirement pension system as the US but
24The model does poorly in explaining the small L50-10 in France (12%). One reason could be the legal
minimum wage (not modeled here), which is equal to 62% of average earnings in France—the highest among
the CEU and much higher than the 36% of average earnings in the U.S. If these diﬀerences were modeled,
it might be possible to reconcile the model better with the very small lower tail wage inequality in France.
24diﬀer in all other dimensions considered in the baseline model. This experiment separates
the role of the tax system for wage inequality from that of the pension system. Second, we
also set the consumption taxes of each country equal to that in the US, but each country
retains its own income tax schedule as in the baseline model. This experiment quantiﬁes the
explanatory power of the model that is coming from the income tax system alone. Third, we
go one step further and assume that each country keeps the same progressivity of its income
tax schedule but is identical in all other ways to the US, including the average income tax
rate. This experiment isolates the role of progressivity alone. In each case, we adjust the
lump-sum transfers to balance the government’s budget.
Table 6 reports the results. First, in column 2, we assume that all countries have the
same pension system as the US. In panel A, the correlation between the data and model is
only slightly lower than in the baseline case for all parts of the wage distribution. Turning to
panel B, the fraction of the US-CEU diﬀerence explained by the model goes down—but only
slightly—indicating that more than 95% of the model’s explanatory power is coming from
taxes (both income and consumption taxes). Next, in column (3), we also eliminate the
diﬀerences in consumption taxes across countries. The model-data correlations go further
down but, again, somewhat modestly. In panel B, the explanatory power of the model that
is attributable to income taxes alone ranges from 75% to 80% for the three measures of
wage inequality. The diﬀerence between columns 2 and 3 provides a useful measure of the
role of consumption taxes, which account for about 17% (=9 6 %  79%)o ft h em o d e l ’ s
explanatory power for L90-10.
Next, we investigate whether the power of income taxes comes from diﬀerences in the
average rates across countries or from diﬀerences in the progressivity structure. In other
words, if continental Europe diﬀered from the US only in the progressivity of its labor
income tax system—but had the same average tax rate on labor income—how much of the
diﬀerences in wage inequality found in the baseline model would still remain? To answer
this question, we proceed as follows. First, adjusting the average tax rate to the US level—
without aﬀecting progressivity—requires some care. We show in Appendix B.2 how this
can be accomplished. Then, using these hypothetical tax schedules, we solve each country’s
problem, assuming that all countries have identical labor market policies (set to the US
benchmark) and their tax schedules generate the same average tax rate as in the US when
using individuals’ choices made using the US income tax schedule. In panel B of column 4,
we see that progressivity alone is responsible for 2/3 of the explanatory power of the model
for L90-10.
Notice that the decomposition we conducted here is not invariant to the order in which
diﬀerent features are eliminated. So, a valid question is whether this conclusion—that
25Table 6: Decomposing the Eﬀects of Diﬀerent Policies
Benchmark All taxes Lab. Inc. Tax Progressivity
Diﬀ. from Benchmark: (1) (2) (3) (4)
Progressivity — — — —
Average income taxes — — — set to US
Consumption tax — — set to US set to US
Beneﬁts institutions — set to US set to US set to US
A. Correlation Between Data and Model
90-10 0.91 0.90 0.85 0.88
90-50 0.85 0.87 0.85 0.87
50-10 0.85 0.84 0.78 0.81
B. Fraction of US-CEU Diﬀerence Explained by Model
90-10 0.48 0.46 (96%)a 0.38 (79%) 0.32 (67%)
90-50 0.84 0.79 (94%) 0.67 (80%) 0.55 (66%)
50-10 0.24 0.23 (96%) 0.18 (75%) 0.16 (67%)
aThe numbers in parentheses express the fraction explained by the model in each column as a percentage of
the benchmark case reported in column (1).
average tax rate diﬀerences do not matter much—is robust to changing this order. To
investigate this, we repeated the last experiment reported in column 4, but instead of
eliminating average tax rate diﬀerences and keeping progressivity intact, we ﬂipped the
order (same progressivity as the US, but match each country’s average tax rate). In this
case, the model only accounts for 14% of L90-10 diﬀerences, 20% of L90-50, and 10% of
L50-10. This experiment conﬁrms our previous conclusion that average tax rate diﬀerences
are responsible for only a small fraction of the diﬀerences in wage inequality.
In summary, the pension system and consumption taxes together are responsible for
about 20% of the model’s explanatory power. The more important ﬁnding concerns the
role of progressivity, which, for all practical purposes, is the key component of the income
tax structure for understanding wage inequality diﬀerences. Diﬀerences in the average
income tax rate do not appear to be very important for inequality diﬀerences.
The Role of Labor Supply Elasticity. We now conduct two sensitivity analyses with
respect to the value of labor supply elasticity: we consider (i) the case with a high Frisch
elasticity of 0.5 and (ii) the case with only an extensive margin: n 2{ 0,0.40}.I ne a c hc a s e ,
the model is recalibrated to match the same six targets in Table 4. (Appendix D contains
further sensitivity analyses with respect to the values of ↵,  ,  , G,a sw e l la st h et r e a t m e n t
of capital income taxes.)
26Table 7: Eﬀect of Labor Supply Elasticity on Wage Inequality Diﬀerences
Frisch = 0.5 Discrete hours: n 2{ 0,0.40}
L90-10 L90-50 Log 50-10 L90-10 L90-50 Log 50-10
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Denmark 0.69 1.07 0.40 0.34 0.53 0.21
Finland 0.57 0.88 0.31 0.29 0.43 0.17
France 0.39 1.32 0.16 0.17 0.56 0.07
Germany 0.68 1.01 0.40 0.29 0.42 0.17
Netherlands 0.48 0.70 0.27 0.27 0.38 0.17
Sweden 0.52 0.87 0.33 0.22 0.38 0.15
CEU 57% 94% 31% 26% 44% 16%
UK 13 6 17 2 –3 6
In the ﬁrst experiment we set ' =3 .0, which implies a Frisch elasticity of 0.5. Table 7
reports the counterpart of the analysis we conducted for the benchmark model and reported
in Table 5. Comparing the two tables makes it clear that a higher Frisch elasticity improves
the model’s explanatory power across the board. Now the model can explain 57% of the
US-CEU diﬀerence in L90-10 (compared with 48% in the benchmark case) and 94% of the
upper tail inequality (from 84% before). However, the improvement in L50-10 is modest,
going from 24% in the benchmark case up to 31%.
To better understand the role of the intensive margin of labor supply, we now examine
another case where workers can only choose between full-time employment at ﬁxed hours
(n =0 .40) and nonemployment. The parameters of the utility function are the same as in
the baseline case. The results are reported in the last three columns of Table 7. Without the
ampliﬁcation provided by an intensive margin—and the resulting dispersion in hours across
countries—the explanatory power of the model falls and, in some cases, it falls signiﬁcantly.
For example, the model accounts for 26% of the diﬀerence in L90-10. For the upper-end
inequality, the diﬀerence is even larger: the model now explains 44%, half of the baseline
value, and also much lower than the 94% in the high Frisch case. Finally, the already low
explanatory power at the lower tail falls further from 24% in the baseline case to 16%.
These ﬁndings underscore the importance of the interaction of endogenous labor sup-
ply choice (with an intensive margin) with progressive taxation for understanding wage
inequality diﬀerences across countries, especially above the median of the distribution.
275.2 Inequality Trends over Time: 1983–2003
We now turn from levels in 2003 to the change in wage inequality over time. As shown in
Table 1, from early 1980s to the early 2000s, wage inequality increased signiﬁcantly more in
the United States (by 32 log points) compared with the CEU (6 log points). Can the human
capital mechanisms studied so far help us understand this “widening” of the inequality gap
as well? One challenge we face in trying to answer this question is that the tax schedules
we derived above are only available for the years after 2001, whereas the tax structure has
changed over time for several of the countries in our sample. Fortunately, for two countries
in our sample—the US and Germany—we are also able to derive tax schedules for 1983,
which allows us to conduct a two-country comparison in this section.
How to Introduce SBTC? As noted earlier, in the standard Ben-Porath model
studied so far, the price of human capital (PH) was simply a scaling factor and had no
eﬀect on any implication of the model, which is why we normalized it to 1 above. This is an
important shortcoming when the goal is to study the changes in human capital investment
over time in response to changes in the value of human capital, due to, for example, SBTC.
Guvenen and Kuruscu (2010) proposed a tractable way to extend the Ben-Porath model
that overcomes this diﬃculty. This extension basically involves introducing a second factor
of production—raw labor (`)—in addition to human capital, h. The key assumption is
that, unlike human capital, raw labor cannot be accumulated over the life cycle (it is ﬁxed).
Individuals supply both factors of production for a total hourly wage of (PHhs + PL`)(1 is)
at age s, where PL is now the price (wage) of raw labor. With this two-factor structure, a
rise in PH does increase human capital investment. So SBTC could be modeled as a rise in
PH over time with PL ﬁxed. The formal statement of this model along with the calibration
of SBTC are presented in Appendix D.7. (All parameters other than PH remain essentially
unchanged in calibration.)
Comparing the United States and Germany. The procedure for constructing the
1983 tax schedules is described in Appendix B.3 and the resulting progressivity wedges are
shown in Figure 6. As seen here, in 1983 the progressivity of the tax structure in the US
and Germany was similar in both countries up to about twice the average earnings level.
And above this point, the US actually had the more progressive system. Over time, the US
became much less progressive, whereas the change in Germany was more gradual, making
the US tax schedule much ﬂatter than that of Germany over time.
Using these schedules, we conduct three experiments.25 In the ﬁrst experiment, we
25Because of the computational burden, these experiments only provide steady state comparisons. Al-
28Figure 6: Progressivity Wedges at Diﬀerent Income Levels: US vs. Germany, 1983 and
2003














assume that the tax schedules remained ﬁxed throughout this period. We choose one
parameter that controls the skill bias of technology, PH, to match the 32 log points rise in
L90-10 in the US during the period. Note from column (1) of Table 8 that, in the data, L90-
10 rose by only 13 log points in Germany during the same period. Turning to the model
and assuming that Germany has been subject to the same SBTC as the US, the model
generates a rise of 19 log points in L90-10 for Germany. Thus, whereas the inequality gap
widens in the data by 32   13 = 19 log points, the model predicts 32   19 = 13 log points,
explaining 68% (13/19) of the observed diﬀerence in the data.
Second, in column (3), we consider the case where the only change over time is in the
tax schedules. We do not recalibrate any parameter to match targets in 1983. In the US,
L90-10 rises substantially—by 21 log points—with no SBTC. Hence, the ﬂattening of the
tax schedule alone accounts for a signiﬁcant fraction (about 2/3) of the rise in US wage
inequality during this time. To our knowledge, this result is new in the literature. In
contrast to the US, wage inequality barely changes (by 1 log point) in Germany. This
experiment suggests that the dramatic fall in progressivity in the US and the small change
in Germany alone could explain almost all of the widening inequality gap! Third, we now
incorporate the change in tax schedules and re-calibrate SBTC such that we match the
change in L90-10 for the US.26 Now, L90-10 rises by 9 log points in Germany. Thus, the
model slightly over-explains—by 16% (=0 .22/0.19   1.0)—the widening gap in the data.
though solving for the full transition path is beyond the scope of this paper, it could be important for the
quantitative results, so future work on this issue is certainly warranted.
26The required change in log(PH/PL) is 6.7 log points, which is about one-third of the value we used in
the ﬁrst experiment with ﬁxed tax schedules.
29Table 8: US vs Germany: Changing Tax Schedules and Changing Inequality
Data Model
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Taxes: Fixed Changing Changing
SBTC: Calibrated to US Fixed Calibrated to US
Panel A: Change in L90-10
US 0.32 0.32a 0.21 0.32a
GER 0.13 0.19 0.01 0.09
 (US-GER) 0.19 0.13 0.20 0.22
Panel B: Change in L90-50
US 0.22 0.23 0.15 0.23
GER 0.05 0.14 0.01 0.06
 (US-GER) 0.17 0.09 0.14 0.17
Panel C: Change in L50-10
US 0.10 0.09 0.06 0.09
GER 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.03
 (US-GER) 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.06
aSBTC (PH) calibrated so that the model matches the rise in L90-10 for the US exactly.
Panels B and C of the table explore how much of the widening gap has occurred at
the top and bottom of the distribution. In the data, the L90-50 gap between the US and
Germany rose by 17 log points, whereas the L50-10 gap increased by only 2 log points.
Therefore, a remarkable fact is that virtually all of the rise in the inequality gap occurred
because top-end inequality increased much more in the US (by 0.22) than in Germany
(by 0.05). This observation strongly indicates that to understand the widening inequality
gap, one needs to understand the economic forces that operate above the median of the
wage distribution—and the human capital channels studied here provide one important
candidate. To quantify these human capital eﬀects, we turn to column (4): the model
generates the same 17 log points rise in the L90-50 gap as in the data, and overstates the
L50-10 gap observed in the data by 4 log points.
While these results are encouraging, a caveat must be noted. First, wage inequality
in 1983 depends not only on the tax schedule in 1983, but also on the tax schedules that
were in place several years prior, since the dispersion in human capital across individuals
results from investments made in previous years. Clearly, the same comment applies to
2003. Although in our exercise we do not account for this fact, it is not clear which way
this biases the results. This is because the US tax system was even more progressive before
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, whereas the progressivity change in the years
30Figure 7: Lifecycle Proﬁle of Mean Log Wages: US vs Germany
































preceding 2003 (say, from 1990 to 2003) was more modest. Therefore, if we were to use
at i m ea v e r a g eo ft a xs c h e d u l e si no u re x e r c i s e( s a y ,1 9 7 3t o1 9 8 3a n d1 9 9 3t o2 0 0 3 ) ,w e
conjecture that the reduction in progressivity over time could be larger than we assumed in
the experiment just described (which would attribute an even larger role to taxes). A more
complete examination of this issue is an exciting topic for future research.
6M i c r o e c o n o m i c E v i d e n c e o n t h e M e c h a n i s m
The model also makes predictions for how the lifecycle proﬁle of wages and hours varies
across countries. In particular, because progressivity dampens human capital investment,
average wages should grow more slowly over the life cycle in the CEU. Similarly, because
progressivity compresses the cross-sectional distribution of human capital investment, wage
inequality should rise less over the life cycle in the CEU. Testing these two predictions
requires panel data on wages (to disentangle the age proﬁle from time or cohort eﬀects),
which is diﬃcult to obtain on a comparable basis for the CEU countries in our sample.27 An
exception is the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP), which includes information on
wages and hours of German individuals and is available to outside (non-European Union)
researchers. In this section, we make use of this dataset and the PSID for the United States
to provide a two-country comparison of lifecycle proﬁles.
27Although most of the countries in our sample have panel datasets on individuals, many of these datasets
are either restricted to researchers that are citizens of that country or have documentation that is not trans-
lated into English, making it infeasible for us to use those datasets in our study. The German Socioeconomic
Panel (GSOEP) is available to outside researchers upon the submission and approval of a research proposal.
316.1 Wages and Hours over the Lifecycle: US vs Germany
We focus on male workers who are between 25 and 55 years of age to minimize the eﬀects
of early retirement behavior and the consequent fall in employment rates at later ages. The
PSID data cover 1968-1992 and the GSOEP data cover 1984 to 2007.
Wages. Figure 7 plots the lifecycle proﬁle of mean log wages in the US and Germany.
The proﬁles are extracted from panel data by cleaning cohort eﬀects following the usual
procedure in the literature; see Appendix E for details. As seen in the ﬁgure, from age 25
to 55 the average wage proﬁle rises by 36 log points in the US, but by only 21 log points in
Germany, consistent with the prediction of the model that a more progressive tax system
generates a ﬂatter average wage proﬁle. Next, ﬁgure 8 plots the lifecycle proﬁle of wage
inequality (again controlled for cohort eﬀects) for the two countries. In the US, the variance
of log wages rises by 26 log points, compared to 15 log points for Germany. Again, inequality
rises more over the lifecycle in the less progressive country, consistent with the mechanism
in the model.
Although, in ﬁgure 8 we normalized the intercept to zero (to help visual comparison),
ar e l e v a n tq u e s t i o ni s ,h o wm u c hw a g ei n e q u a l i t yi st h e r ea tt h et i m ew o r k e r se n t e rt h e
labor market? To answer this question, we compute the variance of log wages for workers
between ages 23 and 27 and ﬁnd it to be very similar in both countries: 0.251 in the US
and 0.260 in Germany.28 This implies that virtually all the diﬀerence in wage inequality
between Germany and the United States documented in the previous section is generated
by the faster rise of inequality over the lifecycle in the US compared to Germany and almost
none is due to diﬀerences in initial inequality. (Incidentally, this ﬁnding is also reassuring,
given that our model assumes identical inequality at age 20.)
Finally, instead of controlling for cohort eﬀects as we did above, one can alternatively
control for time eﬀects. Using this approach, mean log wages rise by 0.37 in the US compared
with 0.27 in Germany. Inequality rises by 0.12 in the US compared with only 0.02 in
Germany. Thus, while the magnitudes change, the rankings of the two countries remain the
same under this alternative approach.29
28For this computation, we use data from 1984 to 1992, which is the period the two datasets overlap.
29The model counterparts of these numbers are also of interest. In the model, the rise in the mean log
wages (from age 25 to 55) in the US exceeds the same statistic in Germany by 0.16, compared with the
0.15 (=0 .36 0.15)ﬁ g u r ei nt h ed a t aw h e nc o h o r te ﬀ e c t sa r ec o n t r o l l e df o ra n d0 . 1 0( =0 .37 0.27) when
time eﬀects are controlled for. Similarly, in the model, the rise of wage inequality in the US exceeds that in
Germany by 0.16, compared with 0.11 and 0.10 in the data without cohort and time eﬀects, respectively.
By and large, the model is consistent with the signs and rough magnitudes of the diﬀerences seen in the
data.
32Figure 8: Within-Cohort Variance of Log Wages: US vs Germany



























Ac o m p l e m e n t a r yp i e c eo fe v i d e n c ei sp r e s e n t e di nD o m e i ja n dF l o d e n( 2 0 1 0 )f r o m
Sweden. These authors construct the analog of ﬁgure 8 for Sweden and ﬁnd that the rise
in wage inequality over the life cycle is much smaller than in both the US and Germany.30
Given the high progressivity of income taxes in Sweden compared with the US and Germany,
this outcome is exactly what is predicted by the present model.
Labor Hours. We begin with the dispersion in hours. In Germany (GSOEP), the stan-
dard deviation of log hours is 0.369 compared with 0.324 in the United States (PSID).31
It is a well-known fact that incomplete markets models without preference heterogeneity
severely understate the level of hours inequality (c.f. Erosa et al. (2009)) and our model is
no exception. In the model,  (log(n)) = 0.112 in the US and 0.128 in Germany.32 Despite
missing on the levels, the model is consistent with the fact that hours inequality is somewhat
higher in Germany than in the US.
At ﬁrst blush, it may seem surprising that the model implies higher dispersion in the
more progressive country. The reason has to do with lump sum transfers, which happens to
work in the opposite direction to progressivity in this two-country comparison. Speciﬁcally,
the calibrated model implies that lump-sum transfers in Germany are more than twice as
large as in the US. By their nature, these transfers create a larger wealth eﬀect on low-
30In Sweden, from age 25 to 55, the variance of log wages rises by 0.08 when controlling for time eﬀects
and falls by 0.06 when controlling for cohort eﬀects; see Domeij and Floden (2010, ﬁgs. 13 and 14).
31These statistics are computed using data from 1984 to 1992, which is the period the datasets overlap.
32The standard way to circumvent this problem is to introduce heterogeneity in work-leisure preferences,
which is the route followed by, among others, Heathcote et al. (2007), Bils et al. (2009), and Kaplan (2010).
Because hours inequality is not the main focus of this paper, we have not pursued this approach here.
33income individuals (it is a larger fraction of their income) and, therefore, reduce their labor
supply more than that of higher-income individuals. Thus, countries with higher lump-sum
payments (or more redistributive government services), ceteris paribus, have higher hours
inequality. To illustrate this point, we solve the model for Germany by ﬁxing the lump
sum transfers to the same fraction as in the US and assume the rest of the budget surplus
yields no utility. The implied standard deviation of log hours falls from 0.128 to 0.098,
which is now lower than in the US. Therefore, the predictions of the model regarding hours
inequality is in general ambiguous, being driven by progressivity and the size of lump-sum
transfers.
As for average hours, the prediction of the model is much clearer: countries with more
progressive taxes should have lower average hours. Consistent with this prediction, it is well
documented that Americans on average work much longer hours than Europeans (Prescott
(2004), Ohanian et al. (2008)). Here we show that the same is true when we focus on male
workers. For Germany, Wanger (2006, Table 3) reports that the average hours per (male)
worker in 2003 was 1,557 hours. For the same year, Heathcote et al. (2010, ﬁgure 2) report
that the average hours per (male) person was 1890 hours, or 21% higher than in Germany.33
Given that hours per worker must be higher than hours per person, this provides a lower
bound on the gap between German and US males. This gap is even higher than what is
predicted by the model (which is 12.3%).
Overall, the lifecycle evidence on wages and hours documented in this section are in
line with—and therefore provide further support to—the human capital mechanism that
operates in our model.
6.2 Survey Measures of Human Capital Inequality
So far we have focused on the model’s implications for variables that are easily measured in
the data, such as wages and hours. However, the model also makes very clear predictions
about how human capital dispersion should vary by country (or with the progressivity of
the country’s tax system). We now test three such predictions in the data.
To conduct this analysis, we need an empirical measure of human capital at the individual-
level for the countries in our sample. The data source we use is the International Adult
33For the average hours statistics, we do not use the GSOEP and PSID because these data sets seem
to overstate average hours. For example, Fuchs-Schündeln et al. (2010) document that average hours in
GSOEP is about 300 hours lower than the NIPA counterpart (called IAB) in 1980 and this gap grows to
more than 500 hours by year 2000. This gap seems to be largely attributed to the insuﬃcient treatment
in GSOEP of vacation and sick days and other factors that impact the number of work days per year. For
consistency, and because similar issues are also relevant for the PSID, we do not use it either. Instead we
rely on CPS for the US and IAB data for Germany.
34Table 9: Human Capital Dispersion
Cross-Country Correlation of Test Score Dispersion (Data) with:





Literacy Survey (IALS), which is a large-scale, international comparative assessment de-
signed to measure a range of skills linked to the economic characteristics of the adult
population (ages 16 to 65) within and across nations. The IALS has been extensively used
as a measure of human capital of the working age population in the literature (see, among
others, Nickell and Bell (1995); Devroye and Freeman (2000); Leuven et al. (2004) and the
references therein). We use data from the 1998 survey—the latest available—which contains
data from seven of the eight countries in our sample, the exception being France.
First, we investigate whether, in the data, higher wage dispersion in a given country
is accompanied with larger human capital dispersion, as robustly predicted by our model.
Column (1) of Table 9 reports the cross-country correlations between wage and human
capital dispersions, the latter measured by the IALS quantitative literacy test score.34 Each
correlation is computed using the same measure of dispersion for both variables (L90-10,
L90-50, or L50-10). The correlations are strong regardless of the part of the distribution
we focus on. Although not reported in the table, the test score dispersion also varies
signiﬁcantly across countries. For example, the country with—by far—the largest dispersion
is the US, with a 90-10 percentile ratio of 2.26 (as measured by the quantitative score),
followed by the UK with 1.83. At the other end lie the Scandinavian countries with a 90-10
percentile ratio of 1.45. (The prose and document literacy tests reveal even larger gaps.)
Second, we compare the human capital dispersion implied by the model to that found in
the data across countries. Column (2) of Table 9 reports the correlations between the human
capital dispersion in the model and those measured by the IALS data. The correlation is
robust, ranging from 0.78 to 0.88. Third, and as discussed earlier, our model predicts that
countries with a more progressive tax system will have less dispersion in human capital
34The IALS survey is composed of three tests: (i) quantitative literacy (measuring arithmetic and ana-
lytical skills used in typical work situations); (ii) prose literacy (the skills needed to understand and use
information from texts, including editorials, news stories, poems, etc.); and (iii) document literacy (the
skills required to locate and use information contained in various formats, including maps, tables, graphs,
job applications, etc.). In Table 9 we reports the results using the quantitative literacy results. We omit
the other two measures for brevity because they give very similar results across the board.
35across individuals. Using P(0.5,2.5),t h em e a s u r eo fw e d g ee m p l o y e de a r l i e r ,t h ec o r r e l a t i o n
with the L90-10 measure of IALS human capital dispersion is –0.79. (Using other test results
or alternative wedges (e.g., P(0.5,0.5k),k=2 ,3,...,6) yields equally strong results.)
When these three empirical ﬁndings from survey data are put together with the evidence
on the lifecycle proﬁles of wages from US and Germany, they provide strong support to the
human capital mechanism that is operational in our model.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper, we have studied the eﬀects of progressive labor income taxation on wage
inequality when a major source of wage dispersion is diﬀerential rates of human capital
accumulation. To understand the main mechanisms and their quantitative importance, we
have examined diﬀerences in wage inequality between the United States and seven Euro-
pean countries, which diﬀer signiﬁcantly in their income tax structures as well as in other
dimensions of their labor market institutions. A common theme in our ﬁndings is that the
model is signiﬁcantly better at explaining inequality diﬀerences at the upper tail compared
to the lower tail. Institutions, such as unionization, minimum wage laws (as in the case of
France, discussed earlier), and centralized bargaining, are likely to be more important for
the lower tail. However, since changes in the upper tail have been so important during this
time (as we have documented), the mechanisms studied in this paper provide a promising
direction for understanding US-CEU diﬀerences in wage inequality. We also found that
the most important policy diﬀerence for wage inequality is the progressivity of the income
tax system, which is responsible for about two-thirds of the model’s explanatory power.35
Finally, we turn to the changes in wage inequality over time. In a two-country the model
can account for all of the widening of the inequality gap between the US and Germany,
when the actual changes in the tax schedules were also incorporated.
We have also explored the micro implications of the model, which provided further
supporting evidence for the model. For example, the lifecycle proﬁle of mean wages is
ﬂatter in Germany than in the United States, as implied by the higher progressivity in the
former country. A similar result is found for within-cohort wage inequality in Germany and
the US. Similarly, average hours for males is much lower in Germany than it is in the US.
35In the working paper version (Guvenen et al. (2009)) we conducted the same analysis using data on all
workers as opposed to male workers as we did here. The results of that analysis was remarkably similar to
those found here. To us, this suggests that the same mechanisms emphasized in this paper are likely to be
as important for female workers as it is for males, despite large diﬀerences across countries in female labor
force participation.
36These observations are consistent with the predictions of the model and provide further
support to the empirical relevance of the human capital mechanisms explored in this paper.
An alternative mechanism that is also consistent with the US-Europe inequality gap
was proposed by Becker (1985). In his framework, workers choose both hours of work
in the market and eﬀort per hour. High ability workers in the US put more eﬀort per
hour (and are therefore more productive) than comparable workers in Europe because the
return is relatively higher. Thus, wage inequality will be higher in the US than in Europe.
An important diﬀerence between this mechanism and ours is that our model implies a
widening of wage inequality over the life cycle in the US relative to Europe (as documented
in Section 6.1), whereas Becker’s model implies that wage inequality would be constant over
the lifecycle.
An alternative way of modeling for skill acquisition would be through “learning by doing
(LBD),” which diﬀers from human capital models in some subtle ways. To understand this,
notice that in an LBD model, human capital is acquired by working longer hours. The
marginal cost of work is given by the marginal utility of leisure, which is independent of
the current tax rate. The marginal beneﬁt is the increase in utility due to higher after-tax
earnings both in the current period (higher earnings from longer hours) and future periods
(higher wages because of accumulated skills). So, for example, if current taxes are raised
without aﬀecting future taxes, this would increase human capital investment in Ben-Porath
as we saw in Section 2.2 (because the cost of investment is the current after-tax wage,
which is lower now). In contrast, in an LBD model, this will decrease current hours of work
because part of the marginal beneﬁt of work (current after-tax earnings) falls. But if there
is less work, there is less skill acquisition in an LBD model. This is one example where a
change in taxes can increase investment in Ben-Porath while reducing it with learning by
doing. However, that this is a carefully selected example. There are many other cases where
both models would have qualitatively the same implication (for example if future taxes are
raised without aﬀecting current taxes).
Finally, we have made several assumptions to make the quantitative exercise compu-
tationally feasible.36 An important direction to extend the current framework would be
by carefully modeling the diﬀerences between the US and the CEU in the ﬁnancing of the
education system as well as in the types of skills taught in schools in both places. This is
ad i ﬃ c u l tb u ti n t e r e s t i n gq u e s t i o nt h a ti sa tt h et o po fo u rf u t u r er e s e a r c ha g e n d a .
36The numerical solution of the model requires care because the individuals’ dynamic problem has several
sources of non-convexities. As a result, solving for the equilibrium takes about 14 hours for the US and UK,
and as much as 30 hours for some countries like Denmark. This makes calibration very time consuming,
which prevented us from extending the model in other directions.
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38AT h e o r e t i c a l A p p e n d i x : D e r i v a t i o n s a n d D e ﬁ n i t i o n s
A.1 Derivation of the Optimal Investment Condition (eq. (7))
Here, we derive the optimal investment condition in the most general framework studied in this
paper, described in Section 5.2. The optimality conditions presented earlier in the paper ((4), (5),
and (7)) can all be obtained as special cases of this formulation.
Under the assumptions stated in Section 5.2 (i.e., setting   ⌘ 1, eliminating pension payments
(⌦ ⌘ 0), and setting idiosyncratic shocks to their mean value), the problem of the agent is given
by
V (h,a,s) = max
cs,ns,Qs
u((1 + r)as + ys(1   ¯ ⌧(ys))   as+1,1   n)
+ V (hs+1,a s+1,s+ 1)
s.t. ys =( ✓Ll + ✓Hhs)ns   C(Qs).
Note that total tax liability of the agent is given by y¯ ⌧(y). The derivative of tax liability with
respect to y gives the marginal tax rate. Thus, ⌧(y)=¯ ⌧(y)+y¯ ⌧0(y). Using this expression, we
obtain the following FOCs for this problem
(ns): ( ✓Ll + ✓Hhs)(1  ⌧(ys))u1(cs,1   ns)=u2(cs,1   ns)
(as): u1(cs,1   ns)= V2(hs+1,a s+1,s+ 1)
(Qs): C0(QS)(1  ⌧(ys))u1(cs,1   ns)= V1(hs+1,a s+1,s+ 1)
Envelope conditions are:
(as): V2(hs,a s,s)=( 1+r)u1(cs,1   ns)
(hs): V1(hs,a s,s)=ns (1   ⌧(ys))u1(cs,1   ns)+ns+1 V1(hs+1,a s+1,s+ 1).
Combining the envelope conditions with the FOCs yields




















ns+1 +  21   ⌧(ys+2)
1   ⌧(ys)




Deﬁnition 1 As t a t i o n a r yr e c u r s i v ec o m p e t i t i v ee q u i l i b r i u mf o rt h i se c o n o m yi sas e to fe q u i l i b -
39rium decision rules, c(x), n(x), Q(x), i(x),a n da0(✏0,x);v a l u ef u n c t i o n s ,V (x) and WR(x),f o r
working and retirement periods, respectively, where x =( h,a,m;✏,s,j) (notice the inclusion of j
into this vector); a pricing function for Arrow securities, q(✏0|✏),a n dam e a s u r e⇤(x) such that
1. Given the labor income tax function, ¯ ⌧(y),c o n s u m p t i o nt a x ,¯ ⌧c,t r a n s f e r s ,Tr, and govern-
ment’s pension function ⌦,i n d i v i d u a l s ’d e c i s i o nr u l e sa n dv a l u ef u n c t i o n ss o l v ep r o b l e m si n
(9) to (13) and in (14).
2. Asset markets clear:
R
x(:,✏=˜ ✏) a0(✏0,x)d⇤(x)=0for all combinations of (˜ ✏,✏0).37
3. ⇤(x) is generated by individuals’ optimal choices.













The ﬁrst term in the government’s budget is the total tax revenue from labor income collected
from all agents who are working and younger than retirement age. Similarly, the second term is
the total tax revenue from the consumption tax, but it is collected from all agents including the
retirees. On the right-hand side, the pension payments only depend on a worker’s ability through
yj and the number of years she worked until retirement (mS(x)), which in turn depends on the
full state vector x at age S   1. Therefore, we integrate the pension payments over the full state
vector x conditioning on age S  1 and then sum the same amount over all ages greater than S  1
to ﬁnd total pension payments.
BC o u n t r y - S p e c i ﬁ c L a b o r M a r k e t P o l i c i e s
B.1 Estimating Country-Speciﬁc Average Tax Schedules
Here we provide more details on the estimation of tax schedules described in Section 2.2. Deﬁne
normalized income as e y ⌘ y/AW. For each country, denote the top marginal tax rate with ⌧TOP
and the top bracket e yTOP. The values for these variables are taken from the OECD tax database.38
As noted in the text, we already have average tax rates for all income levels below 2 (i.e., two times
AW ). For values above this number, we have to consider separately the case where a country’s
top marginal tax rate bracket is lower and higher than 2. In the former case (e yTOP < 2), since we
37The notation x(:,✏=˜ ✏) indicates that the integral is taken over the entire domain of variables in state
vector x, except for , which is set equal to ˜ ✏.O t h e r sb e l o wa r ed e ﬁ n e da n a l o g o u s l y .
38From Table I.7, available for download at www.oecd.org/ctp/taxdatabase.
40Table A.1: Tax Function Parameter Estimates
¯ ⌧(y/AW)=a0 + a1(y/AW)+a2(y/AW) 
Country: a0 a1 a2  R 2
Denmark 1.4647  .01747  1.0107  .15671 0.990
Finland 1.7837  .01199  1.4518  .11063 0.999
France 0.5224 .00339  .24249  .41551 0.993
Germany 1.8018  .01708  1.3486  .11833 0.992
Netherlands 3.1592  .00790  2.8274  .03985 0.984
Sweden 9.1211  .00762  8.7763  .01392 0.985
UK 0.5920  .00390  .32741  .30907 0.989
US 1.2088  .00942  .94261  .10259 0.993
know the average tax rate at e y =2 , each additional dollar up to 2 is taxed at the rate of ⌧TOP.
Therefore, for e y>2
¯ ⌧(e y)=( ¯ ⌧(2) ⇥ 2+⌧TOP ⇥ (e y   2))/(e y)
If instead e yTOP > 2 (which is only the case for the US and France), we do not know the marginal
tax rate between e y =2and e yTOP. Thus, we ﬁrst set ⌧(2) = (¯ ⌧(2) ⇥ 2   ¯ ⌧(1.75) ⇥ 1.75)/0.25 and





e yTOP 2 (e y   2) if 2 < e y<e yTOP
⌧TOP if e y>e yTOP.
Then the average tax rate function for e y>2 is
¯ ⌧(e y)=
⇢
(¯ ⌧(2) ⇥ 2+⌧(e y) ⇥ (e y   2))/e y if 2 < e y<e yTOP
(¯ ⌧(2) ⇥ 2+
(⌧(2)+⌧TOP)
2 (e yTOP   2) + ⌧TOP ⇥ (e y   e yTOP))/e y if e y>e yTOP
We use this expression to compute ⌧ for e y =3 ,4,...,8 (in addition to the original average tax
rate from OECD website). We then ﬁt the functional form given in equation (8) to these 13 data
points as explained in the text. The resulting coeﬃcients are reported in Table A.2.
B.2 Deriving Tax Schedules with Diﬀerent Progressivity but Same
Average Tax Rate
To change the average tax rates in Europe without changing progressivity, we apply the following
procedure. Let ⌧i(y) be the marginal tax rate in country i for income level y. We would like to
obtain a new tax schedule ⌧⇤
i (y) with the same progressivity but with a diﬀerent level. Thus, we
















Letting this ratio to be equal to a constant k, the new tax schedule ⌧⇤ is obtained by the following
expression:
1   ⌧⇤
i (y)=k(1   ⌧i(y)) for all y. (18)
Let the average tax rate be
¯ ⌧i(y)=a0 + a1y + a2y  ) ⌧i(y)=a0 +2 a1y + a2(  + 1)y .
Plugging this last expression into (20) and solving for ⌧⇤(y), we get
⌧⇤
i (y)=1  k + k
h
a0 +2 a1y + a2(  + 1)y 
i
.
Observing that y¯ ⌧i(y)=
R y
0 ⌧i(x)dx, we can solve for the average tax rate ¯ ⌧⇤
i (y) as
¯ ⌧i
⇤(y)=1  k + k[a0 + a1y + a2y ]=1  k + k¯ ⌧i(y). (19)
The new schedule ¯ ⌧⇤
i (y) has the same progressivity as ¯ ⌧i(y) but can have any desired average tax
rate. We choose k so that the average labor income tax rate in country i is equal to the average
labor income tax rate in the US.
B.3 Constructing Tax Schedules for 1983
Here, we describe the formulas we use to calculate the average tax rate at diﬀerent income levels
for Germany and the United States in 1983. This information is obtained from the OECD (1986)
(see pages 104–105 and 244–248 for the US and pages 74–75 and 149–154 for Germany. In all
calculations for Germany, the monetary ﬁgures are in Deutsche Mark (DM). Gross income is
denoted by GM.
B.3.1 Germany
Social Security Contributions. In 1983, the social security system in Germany had two brackets
with their respective tax rates. Speciﬁcally, social security contributions (SSC) were given by:
SSC =0 .1138 ⇥ (min(GI,64800) + 0.0588(min(GI,48600)).
Allowances. Each worker receives an allowance (tax exemption) of DM 1080 and an allowance
of DM 564 for work-related expenses. The OECD considers other miscellaneous allowances in the
amount of DM 1606. We treat this amount as ﬁxed for all levels of income. Finally, workers are
42able to deduct part of their social security contributions determined by this formula:
SSC Allowance = max{6000   0.18(GI),0}
+min(2340,max{SSC   max{6000   0.18(GI),0}})
+0.5 ⇥ min(2340,max{SSC   max{6000   0.18GI,0} 2340,0}).
Total Tax. Putting together the taxes and allowances just described gives the taxable income
of a worker:
Taxable Income = GI-SSC Allow.-Basic Allow.-Work-related and other Allow.
Now, we can calculate the tax liability to the household. The ﬁrst step is to round the taxable
income.
Rounded Taxable Income (RTI) = round(Taxable Income/54) ⇥ 54.
We calculate two variables Y and Z that will be used in the calculations that follow. They are
deﬁned as Y = RTI 18000
10000 and Z = RTI 60000
10000 . To obtain the income tax for a worker, we need to
apply Germany’s tax schedule in 1983:
Income Tax=
8
> > > > > > <
> > > > > > :
zero if RTI  4212
0.22 ⇥ RTI   926 if 4213 < RTI  18035
(((3.05Y   73.76)Y + 695)Y + 2200) ⇥ Y + 3034 if 18036 < RTI  60047
(((0.09Z   5.45)Z + 88.13)Z + 5040) ⇥ Z + 20018 if 60048 < RTI  130031)
0.56 ⇥ RTI   14837 if RTI > 130032
Average Tax Rate =
Income Tax + SSC
Gross Income
.
B.3.2 The United States
Social Security Contribution. In 1983, the employee social security contribution in the US was
given by
SSC Employee =0 .067 ⇥ (min(Gross Income,35700))
The employer’s social security contribution matches the employee’s contribution of 6.7% on
earnings up to $35700. Additionally, employers are required to pay an unemployment tax of 6.2%
of earnings up to $7000 and a nationwide average for state-sponsored tax plan of 2.8% of earnings
up to $7624.
SSC Employee =0 .067 ⇥ (min(GI,35700)) + 0.062 ⇥ (min(GI,7000)) + 0.028 ⇥ (min(GI,7624))
Allowances. The total combined allowances and exemptions amount to $2300 per worker.
Taxable Income = Gross Income   Basic Allowance   Tax Bracket Allowance.
Federal Income Tax. Now, we can calculate the tax liability for the household. We need
to apply the US tax schedule in 1983. The ﬁrst $2300 is not taxed, as discussed earlier. The tax
43rate is 11% when taxable income is in range (2300,3400);i s13% in range (3400,4400);i s15%
in range (4400,8500); 17% in range (8500,10800);i s1 9 %i nr a n g e( 1 0 8 0 0 , 1 2 9 0 0 ) ;i s2 1 %i nr a n g e
(12900,15000);i s2 4 %i nr a n g e( 1 5 0 0 0 , 1 8 2 0 0 ) ;i s2 8 %i nr a n g e(18200,23500);i s3 2 %i nr a n g e
(23500,28800); is 36% in range (28800,34100); is 40% in range (34100,41500); is 45% in range
(41500,55300); and 50% above $55,300.
State and Local Taxes. For the purposes of calculating local and state taxes, the OECD
considers a worker that lives in Detroit, Michigan. Detroit allows an exemption of $600, then a
ﬂat 3% tax is applied. Tax Detroit =0 .03(GI   600). The formula for Michigan’s state income
tax is given by
Tax Michigan =0 .0635(GI   1500)   0.05max(Tax Detroit-200,0) + 27.5
Total Local Tax = Tax Michigan + Tax Detroit
Total Tax. The total tax liability is equal to the income tax plus the social security contribu-
tion and the local tax. Then, we have




The details of the pension beneﬁts system for OECD countries used in this paper are taken
from the OECD publication entitled “Pensions at a Glance: 2007.” The speciﬁc numbers used in
this section are from Table I.2 and the unnumbered table on page 35 of that document. Further
details of these pension systems, including the number of years required to qualify for full beneﬁts,
and so on, are described more fully on pages 26–35 of the same document. Let yj be the lifetime
average of net (after-tax) labor earnings of all individuals with ability level j; and let y be the same
variable averaged across all ability levels. Finally, recall that mR is the total number of years a
worker has been employed up to the retirement age, and let m be the maximum number of years of
work that an individual can accumulate retirement credits in a given country. The net retirement









The ﬁrst term approximates the credit accumulation process whereby individuals qualify for full
retirement beneﬁts after working a certain number of years and only qualify for partial pensions if
they retire before that. We set m equal to 40 years for all countries. Diﬀerent countries diﬀer mainly
in the value of the coeﬃcients a and b. Broadly speaking, a determines the “insurance” component
of retirement income, because it is independent of the individual’s own lifetime earnings, whereas
b captures the private returns to one’s own lifetime earnings. In this sense, a retirement system
with a high ratio of a/b provides high insurance but low incentives for high earnings and vice versa
for a low ratio of a/b. Inspecting the coeﬃcients in the table shows that there is a very wide range
of variation across countries. Finally, some countries have a ceiling on pensionable income and
44Table A.2: Pension System Formulas
ab Ranges Ceiling for Pensionable
Income (as % of AW)
DEN 0.371 0.528 all —
FIN 0.011 0.695 all —
FRA 0.141 0.484 all 300%
GER -0.004 0.621 if yj  1.5¯ y
0.927 if yj > 1.5¯ y 150%
NET 0.005 0.928 all —
SWE -0.021 0.735 all 367%
UK 0.257 0.154 if yj  ¯ y 115%
0.315 0.096 if ¯ y<yj  1.5¯ y
0.396 0.042 yj > 1.5¯ y
US 0.168 0.355 all 290%
entitlements, which is also reported in Table A.2.
CF u r t h e r D e t a i l s o f C a l i b r a t i o n
Dispersion of wage growth rates. Using male hourly earnings data, Haider (2001)
estimates a value of  (bj)=2 .07, and using annual earnings data he estimates it to be 2.02%. Baker
(1997, Table 4, rows 6 and 8) uses an annual earnings measure and estimates values of 1.76% and
1.97% in the two most closely related speciﬁcations to the present paper, whereas Guvenen (2009)
ﬁnds a value of 1.94%, again using male annual earnings data. Finally, Guvenen and Smith (2009)
estimate a process for household annual earnings and obtain a value of 1.87%.
Calibration of the stochastic component. Over the sample period, Haider estimates
the average innovation variance to be 0.074, an AR coeﬃcient of 0.761, and an MA coeﬃcient of
 0.42. Using these parameters, the unconditional variance is 0.109. We match the average of
the ﬁrst three autocorrelation coeﬃcients because Haider (2001) estimates an ARMA(1,1) process,
whereas in our model we employ a slightly more parsimonious structure (AR(1)+ iid shock). This
latter formulation is a common choice in calibrated macroeconomic models because it requires one
fewer state variable while still capturing the dynamics of wages quite well. Nevertheless, because of
this diﬀerence, it is not possible to exactly match each autocorrelation coeﬃcient in the ARMA(1,1)
speciﬁcation and, so, we match the average of the ﬁrst three. In the calibrated model, the ﬁrst
three autocorrelations are 0.48, 0.33, and 0.20 compared to 0.42, 0.32, and 0.24 in the data.
DF u r t h e r S e n s i t i v i t y A n a l y s i s
In all of the following robustness exercises, we recalibrate our model to the empirical targets
described in Section 4.
45D.1 Taxing Capital Income
In our baseline model, we abstracted from taxation of capital income for two reasons. First, some
plausible formulations of capital income taxation substantially complicates the numerical solution
of the model by invalidating a relatively fast algorithm we were able to use in its absence. Second,
the actual treatment of capital income is quite complex, certainly much more so than labor income.
For example, some countries (e.g., the United States) tax certain forms of capital income as ordinary
income (i.e., they tax “total” income), whereas some other countries (e.g., France, Finland, and
Sweden) allow individuals to pay a lower ﬂat-rate tax on certain types of capital income (such as
interest income). See, for example, the discussion in Carey and Rabesona (2002, Table 22) and on
pages 158-160. Modeling the complexities of this institutional detail is beyond the scope of this
paper, so in the benchmark model studied in the main text we abstracted entirely from capital
income taxes.
With these caveats in mind, here we attempt to quantify the eﬀects of taxing capital income in
a simple way. Basically, we assume that the government taxes total income—inclusive of capital
income—subject to the tax schedules derived in this paper. To understand why taxing total
income could matter for ours results, ﬁrst notice that there are essentially two types of assets in
our economy: human capital and ﬁnancial assets. When capital income is taxed at the ﬂat rate
as in our benchmark analysis, progressivity reduces only the return on human capital hindering
investment in human capital relative to investment in ﬁnancial assets. On the other hand, when
progressive tax is applied to total income, progressivity reduces both the return on human capital
and ﬁnancial assets. Thus progressivity does not reduce investment in human capital relative to
investment in ﬁnancial asset as much as in the case where progressivity aﬀects only labor income.
To conduct this exercise we have to make some simplifying assumptions to our model and
develop a new computational method. The reason is that our computational procedure for the
benchmark model relies on the property that the return on savings is independent of the tax
rate (which is no longer true in this experiment). This allowed us to compute the human capital
investment and consumption-savings decision separately and iteratively. When the progressive
tax is applied to total income however, we can no longer use this procedure because we need to
compute the total income at each age to compute the tax rate the agent is facing. Thus, we need
to solve the human capital investment jointly with consumption-saving decision. However, then it
becomes very hard to solve this problem with value function methods, since an individual has to
know his borrowing limit in a period to make his optimal choices, which depends on his lifetime
human capital and labor supply choices.
To circumvent these problems, we consider a benchmark without idiosyncratic shocks and
set   =1 . Since there are no shocks in this version of the model, our target moments reduce to
average wage growth, standard deviation of wage growth rates, and variance of wages due to proﬁle
heterogeneity only. The latter two are obtained from Guvenen (2007). Notice that because (i) there
are no shocks and (ii) individuals want to invest signiﬁcantly early on, they would have a very
strong incentive to borrow when utility is separable and hence they want constant consumption.
This implies that wealth is negative for many individuals with standard power utility preferences.
To mitigate this eﬀect and allow consumption to rise over the lifecycle we use preferences as in
Greenwood et al. (1988) (often called GHH). With this structure, we are able to solve the model
both when capital income is and is not taxed.
The main ﬁnding is the following. The new benchmark model with no capital income taxes
46can account for 69% of the L90-10 gap between the US and CEU in 2003. (This is up from 48%
in the baseline model in the text with shocks and   =0 .5.) Adding capital income taxes to this
structure, reduces the explanatory power to 52.8%, for a fall of 23 percent (1   52.8/69). Thus,
if all capital income was taxed at the same rate as labor income, the model’s explanatory power
would be about a one quarter lower than in the baseline case.
Having said that, it should also be stressed that assuming that this exercise is likely to overstate
the real eﬀects of capital income taxation. This is because, as mentioned above, in certain CEU
countries some capital income is taxed at a ﬂat rate, which is not the case in the United States.
Consequently, in those countries, progressivity aﬀects only labor income, making investment in
physical assets more attractive than investment in human capital, in turn further compressing the
wage distribution. Hence, incorporating such diﬀerences would further lower inequality in the CEU
and increase the explanatory power of the model. While we do not pursue this approach here, this
is an important point to keep in mind.
D.2 Accounting for Cross-Country Variation in Retirement Age
Our baseline model does not allow for variation in retirement age across countries. However, such
variation could have important implications for human capital investment by aﬀecting the eﬀective
horizon of individuals. Although modeling endogenous retirement is beyond the scope of this paper,
here we explore the eﬀects of allowing for exogenous retirement age diﬀerences across countries.
We estimate the average retirement age by computing the fraction of people who receive social
security pensions and disability beneﬁts at each age.39 We then solve each country’s problem using
the computed retirement age as an exogenous value for S. With this adjustment, the explanatory
power for L90-10 increases to 70%, because countries with more progressivity also turn out to have
a lower retirement age than less progressive ones. So the two eﬀects reinforce each other.
D.3 Maximum investment on the job  
We experiment with two values of  —0.4 and 0.6—one on each side of our baseline choice of
0.5. When   =0 .6, the model’s explanatory power for L90-10 and L90-50 fall to 35% and 51%
respectively, whereas the explanatory power for L50-10 remains unchanged at 24%. It should be
noted however that with this choice of  , the model implies a minimum to mean wage ratio of
0.24, which is quite a bit lower than the 0.29 value in the data (and what was used to pin down the
baseline choice of 0.50 for  ). When   =0 .4, the model explains 61% of the L90-10 diﬀerence
between the US and CEU, 116% of L90-50, and 24% of L50-10. In this case, the min to
mean wage ratio is a more reasonable 0.30.
D.4 Wasteful Government Expenditures versus Transfers
In the baseline model, the surplus was returned back to households in a lump-sum fashion, es-
39The data for the CEU countries are obtained from Erosa et al. (2011). We thank Gueorgui
Kambourov for providing us with their detailed dataset. The data for the US is from Coile and
Gruber (2004)
47Table A.3: Eﬀect of Wasteful Government Spending on Wage Inequality Results
G = Tr=0 .5⇥ Gov’t Surplus
L90-10 L90-50 L50-10
(a) (b) (c)
Denmark 63 90 38
Finland 49 75 29
France 30 71 14
Germany 69 75 60
Netherlands 45 59 31
Sweden 42 67 23
CEU 49% 73% 29%
UK 21 0 49
sentially assuming that government expenditures are perfect substitutes for private consumption.
To examine if our results are sensitive to this assumption, we now assume that half of the gov-
ernment surplus is wasted: G = Tr, and each component equals half of the budget surplus (i.e.,
tax revenues minus beneﬁts payments). This assumption is probably extreme, but it is useful in
illustrating whether the results are sensitive to this scenario. From Table A.3, we see that, quali-
tatively, the explanatory power of the model is lower for some countries for L90-10 and L90-50 but
higher for L50-10. Quantitatively, however, the eﬀect is minimal across the board. In fact, in some
cases, no diﬀerence is visible (because of rounding) compared to the benchmark case in Table 5.
D.5 Depreciation of human capital  
To check the sensitivity of our results to the choice of the human capital depreciation rate, we have
experimented with depreciation rates of 1% and 2%. The model’s explanatory power goes down
to 44% when   =0 .01 and it increases slightly above 50% when   =0 .02.A ni m p o r t a n tp o i n tt o
note is that it is not possible to match two of our targets, mean wage growth and variance of wage
growth rate jointly for depreciation rates below 1 percent. For very low values of depreciation rate,
when we match the increase in wage inequality over the lifecycle, the wage growth turns out to be
very high relative to data. The reason is the following. First note that the learning ability cannot
be negative, and as a result the lowest wage growth is bound by the minus depreciation rate. For
a given minimum ability level, we match the variance of   by adjusting the maximum ability level.
However, when we increase the maximum ability to match the variance of  , the average wage
growth turns out to be very high compared to data when we use a very low depreciation rate.
D.6 Elasticity of human capital production function ↵
When ↵ is higher, there is less diminishing marginal productivity in human capital production.
As a result, human capital investment responds more to changes in incentives due for example to
changes in taxes. The model’s explanatory power increases to 65% when we set ↵ =0 .9 and it
decreases to 28% when we set it to 0.65. Most of the most recent estimates in the literature are
48Table A.4: Rise in Wage Inequality: Model versus Data, 1980–2003. The model is
calibrated to match the 23 log points rise in L90-10 for the US from 1980 to 2003.
Change in Log Wage Diﬀerentials
L90-10 = L90-50 + L50-10
CEU Data Level 0.070 0.063 0.007
% 91% 9%
Model Level 0.168 0.129 0.039
% 77% 23%
US Data Level 0.230 0.160 0.070
% 70% 30%
Model Level 0.232 0.184 0.048
% 79% 21%
Diﬀerence Data: Level 0.160 0.097 0.063
% 61% 39%
Model Level 0.065 0.056 0.009
% 87% 13%
% Explained 41% 58% 14%
above 0.9 (see, e.g., Heckman et al. (1998); Kuruscu (2006)). Thus, our choice of 0.8 is on the
conservative side.
D.7 Results: US versus CEU with Fixed Tax Schedules
Extended Model with SBTC. Here is the formal statement of the model studied in Section
5.2:




































0 = m +1 {i<1&n   nmin}, (24)
i 2 [0, ] [{ 1},
Notice that the only changes are the introduction of raw labor into the labor earnings equation
and human capital accumulation function. The weights ✓H and ✓L in the production function
in (23) capture the relative eﬃciency of human capital and raw labor in producing new human
capital. As in Guvenen and Kuruscu (2010) we focus on the case where PH = ✓H and PL = ✓L.
This extended model has some new parameters that need to be calibrated. Except those
discussed here, all parameter values are kept at the values given in Table 3. An important point
49to note is that for the cross-sectional analysis of the previous section, the two-factor model would
have precisely the same implications as the one-factor Ben-Porath model used earlier. This is
because ✓H and ✓L are constant at a point in time and their values can be normalized to generate
exactly the same results as in the previous section. Thus, with proper choices of ✓H, ✓L,a n dt h e
distribution of lj, we do not need to recalibrate any other parameter and can still obtain the same
results for year 2003 as before. This is the route that we follow in this section.40
For examining the change in inequality over time, we choose  log(✓H/✓L) to match the 23 log
points in L90-10 in the US from 1980 to 2003. The required change in  log(✓H/✓L) is 0.236. With
this calibration, wage inequality rises by 0.168 in CEU during the same time, compared to 0.070
rise in the data (fourth column of Table A.4). These results imply that diﬀerences in labor market
policies, even when they are ﬁxed over time, can generate about 41% (=( 0 .232   0.168)/(0.230  
0.070)) of the widening in the inequality gap between the US and the CEU during this time period.
Another dimension of the rise in wage inequality is seen in the last two columns of Table A.4.
The substantial part of the rise in wage inequality in the CEU has been at the top: L90-50 is
responsible for 91% of the total rise in L90-10, whereas only 9% of the rise took place at the lower
end. A similar outcome, somewhat less extreme, is observed in the US where 70% of the rise in
L90-10 is due to L90-50. The model generates a similar picture: about 77% of the rise in the CEU
and 79% in the US is due to L90-50. An alternative way to express these ﬁgures is that the model
accounts for 58% of the increase in the inequality gap above the median between the US and the
CEU but only 14% of the rising gap below the median. As is clear by now, this is a recurring
theme in this paper: the model accounts for cross-country inequality facts at the upper tail quite
well, but accounts for a smaller fraction at the lower tail.
ED a t a A p p e n d i x : G S O E P a n d P S I D
E.1 Sample Selection and Data Preparation
The sample period for the German SOEP is 1984-2008 and for the PSID is 1968-1992. We keep
only males between 25 and 60 years old, regardless of whether they are heads of household. If an
individual does not report hours, wages or income, he is dropped from the sample. To further trim
earnings outliers, we exclude observations in which earnings grow by more than 500% or less than
-80%, earnings are below 100 Euros (2005) or 2 Dollars (1983) per hour or if they are top-coded.
To ensure consistency, we drop those who report zero hours but positive earnings or zero earnings
but positive hours. We also drop individuals who report more than 80 hours per week for the entire
year, 4160 hours, and ﬂag individuals who work less than one quarter at 40 hours per week, 520
hours. In the PSID, we also drop the SEO oversample.
In the PSID, we have to identify roles within households to pair the “wife” and the “head” of
household’s hours with that individual. To do so, we use the pnum variable in 1967 and require that
the “wife” is female and the seqnum and relatehd variables in subsequent years. The household
40More speciﬁcally, the two-factor model eliminates initial heterogeneity in human capital but instead
introduces raw labor. We make the same assumptions for lj as we made earlier about h
j
0. That is, we assume
that lj is uniformly distributed and is perfectly correlated with Aj. We also assume that ✓H = ✓L =1in
2003, which allows us to use the same mean value and coeﬃcient of variation for lj as for h
j
0 in Table 1.
50head gets seqnum=1 , and wives are seqnum=2and relatehd=2until 1982, when they become
relatehd= 20. In a few cases each year, the hours reported from the household level and matched
to the individual do not match individually reported hours, and we drop these. We also create
consistent a age variable so that the age increments by 1 each observation even when an individual
is surveyed at diﬀerent times in the year.
E.2 Calculations
E.2.1 Residual variables
The lifecycle proﬁles are based on residual log wages. To obtain residuals we regress log wages on
marital status, race in the US case and education level (i.e., dropout, high school or college in the
US; and dropout, vocational, high school or college in Germany). In all regressions, the intercept
is of an unmarried, white, high school graduate. The regression is repeated for every year of the
sample, so the dummy coeﬃcients vary freely over time.
E.2.2 Age Proﬁles
We construct proﬁles in much the same way as Deaton and Paxson (1994) and Storesletten et al.
(2004b). For each variable, we compute mean and variance within an age-year bin, each deﬁned
by a calendar year and a 5 year window of ages. We label these bins by the year and age in the
center of the range. We calculate life-cycle proﬁles with time eﬀects by using coeﬃcients from
regressing these bins on both age and year dummies and weighting by the number of individuals
in the year-age bin. That is, for mean or dispersion of wages within the age-year bin (h,t),w e
estimate
xh,t = dt
h + gt + ✏h,t
The coeﬃcients on age, dt
h are stored as a proﬁle relative to a base at the level or dispersion at age
25 in 1985, the group represented by the intercept term. To calculate proﬁles with cohort eﬀects,
we follow the same procedure, using age coeﬃcients from a regression on age and cohort dummies.
Again, we use the same shift strategy so the average of the proﬁle is the same, whether controlling
time eﬀects or cohort eﬀects.
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